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Abstract
This study evaluated the current DSM-IV conceptualization of posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). It examined predictors (i.e., event, person, and cognitive characteristics) and
the factor structure of PTSD symptoms for events that do and do not meet criterion A. Event,
person, and cognitive variables included in this study explained 47% of the variance in PTSD
symptoms for the criterion A group and 56% of the variance in PTSD symptoms for the noncriterion A group. In both groups, cognitive variables explained the majority of variance in
PTSD symptom severity. Although predictors of PTSD symptoms varied for criterion A and
non-qualifying events, the factor structure was similar, suggesting that trauma responses to
nonqualifying events may look very similar to trauma responses to criterion A events. This study
suggests that a reevaluation of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD is warranted.
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Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

DSM

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders
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Penn State Worry Questionnaire
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White Bear Suppression Inventory

AAQ

Acceptance and Action Questionnaire

PTGI

Posttraumatic Growth Inventory

PTCI

Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory

DRI

Dispositional Resilience Index

SES

Self-efficacy Scale

CSE

Coping Self-Efficacy scale

ACQ

Anxiety Control Questionnaire

PCL-C

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist-Civilian Version
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Introduction
Individual differences in responses to stress (e.g., divorce, loss of employment) have led
to the identification of risk and resiliency factors that predict reactions to trauma (e.g., serious
accident, disaster, violent crime). Important to this field of traumatic stress research is an
examination of what constitutes a traumatic event and what is the most parsimonious and
accurate description of the symptoms that emerge following exposure to a potentially traumatic
event. In other words, what is the best characterization of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)?
In addition, it is important to better understand the relative contribution of event (e.g., type,
duration) and personal characteristics (e.g., demographic and cognitive variables) in the
development of adverse reactions to events. The diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) requires exposure to an event that meets two conditions. As specified in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition – Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; APA,
2000), a person must have been exposed to an event that involved actual or threatened death,
serious injury, or threat to the physical integrity of self or others (criterion A1); further, the
person’s response must have involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror (criterion A2). Given
the presence of an event that meets both conditions of criterion A, PTSD is diagnosed when a
person reports at least one reexperiencing symptom, three avoidance or numbing symptoms, and
two arousal symptoms for a duration of at least a month with clinically significant levels of
distress or impairment in functioning. The definition of trauma has received considerable
attention in recent years, as it has been found that events differ in their capacity to elicit PTSD
(Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995), people sometimes develop PTSD-like
responses to events that do not meet criterion A (Bodkin, Pope, Detke, & Hudson, 2007), and
many people never develop PTSD after experiencing events that meet criterion A (Kessler et al.).
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The imperfect relationship between trauma exposure and PTSD has sparked a great deal
of research on the nature of trauma and PTSD as well as risk and resiliency factors that moderate
and mediate this relationship. In the sections that follow, this paper will explore measurement
issues related to criterion A, the factor structure of PTSD, rates of PTSD development for
different categories of events, and variables that mediate and moderate the relationship between
trauma exposure and PTSD. After a review of the literature, this paper will describe a study that
explored event and personal characteristics as they relate to risk and resiliency factors in PTSD.
Specifically, cognitive models of PTSD were used to generate a set of factors that were
hypothesized to predict PTSD symptoms in response to events that meet criterion A and events
that do not meet criterion A. Cognitive models of PTSD may partially explain why it is that some
persons develop PTSD symptoms after less severe events and, conversely, why some persons do
not develop PTSD after more severe events.
Criterion A Measurement Issues
The diagnostic requirements for assessing trauma exposure have become more specific
over time (Weathers & Keane, 2007). When PTSD was first introduced into the diagnostic
nomenclature in the DSM-III (APA, 1980), criterion A specified that PTSD could be diagnosed
after exposure to a recognizable stressor outside of the range of usual human experience that
would evoke distress in almost everyone. Criterion A in the DSM-III was criticized for not
providing examples of events that were extreme enough to qualify and for neglecting subjective
aspects of traumatization (Breslau & Davis, 1987). In addition, there are a variety of events that
are clearly not outside the range of human experience but which can and do frequently result in
symptoms of PTSD. A list of examples of qualifying events was added to the DSM-III-R (APA,
1987) to clarify the intent of criterion A, but the criterion was still criticized for confusing
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“traumatic” with “statistically rare,” providing little guidance for identifying events that qualify,
and invoking a normative standard that confounds objective and subjective aspects of
traumatization (Weathers & Keane). The DSM-IV (APA, 1994) changed the structure of
criterion A in response to criticisms to form a two-part definition that specifies event
characteristics (i.e., type of exposure and nature of event; criterion A1) and a person’s initial
response to the event (i.e., presence of fear, helplessness or horror; criterion A2). Trauma is
identified when a person “experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or
others” (APA, 2000, p. 467).
Even as the diagnostic guidelines for assessing criterion A1 have become more specific
over time, its measurement in the PTSD literature is still fraught with difficulties (Netland,
2001). Events vary according to magnitude of threat of harm, complexity, frequency, duration,
predictability, and controllability (Weathers & Keane, 2007). Current trauma exposure measures
do not address every dimension of trauma exposure (Weathers & Keane), so researchers must
decide which dimensions of exposure to evaluate (e.g., life threat, frequency) based on the
purposes of the particular study.
Criterion A1 has been criticized for being “overinclusive” in its characterization of
exposure by allowing awareness of an event happening to another person to meet criterion A
(Rosen, 2004). Breslau and Kessler (2001) compared the diagnostic guidelines in the DSM-III-R
to the DSM-IV and suggested that 14 event categories met criterion A1 in the DSM-III-R, and 19
event categories met criterion A1 in the DSM-IV. They found that the five additional events that
met criterion A1 in the DSM-IV (e.g., learning about the sudden unexpected death of a loved
one, or learning that a close relative was sexually assaulted, attacked, in a car accident, or in
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another type of accident) led to a 59.2% increase in the number of events reported in their
sample.
Reliability is another concern in the assessment of criterion A1. Several studies have
found increased reports of trauma exposure upon repeated administrations of trauma measures
(e.g., Roemer, Litz, Orsillo, Ehlich, & Friedman, 1998a; Southwick, Morgan, Nicolaou, &
Charney, 1997), whereas others have found reports to be relatively stable over time (e.g.,
Ouimette, Read, & Brown, 2005). Changes in reporting seem to be particularly salient when
persons are exposed to situations in which they may have encountered numerous discrete events
over a period of time (e.g., combat experiences, sexual and physical abuse, and exposure to
instances of domestic or political violence; Netland, 2001). This phenomenon leads some
researchers (e.g., Netland) to suggest classifying traumatic events as discrete (e.g., rape) or
chronic (e.g., combat exposure, abuse), recognizing that memory for specific instances within
chronic events may be variable.
The addition of criterion A2 in the assessment of PTSD addresses some problems
associated with relying exclusively on criterion A1 but creates new measurement challenges that
have not been addressed in many PTSD studies. Breslau and Kessler (2001) noted that the
increase in reported exposure to qualifying events caused by the expanded definition of trauma
(i.e., criterion A1) was attenuated by the addition of criterion A2, leading to a 22% increase in
exposure to qualifying events (versus the 59.2% increase when criterion A1 was used alone)
using the DSM-IV guidelines rather than the DSM-III-R guidelines. Further, 76.5% of A1 events
in their study resulted in fulfillment of criterion A2 as well, suggesting that initial responses of
fear, helplessness, and horror are common reactions to potentially harmful or life-threatening
events. Although criterion A2 had low positive predictive power in relation to PTSD in one study
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(.34), it had very high negative predictive power (.95), meaning that the absence of A2 was a
strong indicator of PTSD’s absence (Schnurr, Spiro, Vielhauer, Findler, & Hamblen, 2002).
Many PTSD studies assess for the presence of only criterion A1 and do not assess for
criterion A2 (Rasmussen, Rosenfeld, Reeves, & Keller, 2007), but those that do tend to show that
an initial response of fear, helplessness, or horror predicts PTSD presence (e.g., Brewin,
Andrews, & Rose, 2000; Rasmussen et al.). Roemer, Orsillo, Borkovec, and Litz (1998b) found
that retrospective reports of helplessness (but not fear or horror) during the event correlated with
PTSD symptom severity. Several research groups argue that the list of emotions in criterion A2
is too narrow and should include other distressing emotions as well as diminished emotional
responses (Weathers & Keane, 2007). Brewin et al. (2000) found that heightened levels of anger
with others and shame predicted PTSD in the absence of reported initial fear, helplessness, or
horror. Roemer et al. also found that initial numbing or dissociative responses after an event that
satisfied criterion A1 were predictive of PTSD symptoms. A major limitation of all of these
studies is a retrospective assessment of criterion A2. The finding that criterion A2 is a poor
positive predictor of PTSD (Schnurr et al., 2002), however, suggests that there may not be a
strong tendency for current PTSD symptoms to bias a person’s recollection of their initial
response to the event (King, King, Erickson, Huang, Sharkansky, & Wolfe, 2006), as the
majority of persons who endorse criterion A2 do not qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD. In
summary, research needs to examine features of events (e.g., chronic versus acute) that may
predict PTSD emergence/severity, include assessment of criterion A2 in determining whether
experiences qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD, and evaluate other emotional responses that could
be added to criterion A2. The study that follows examined each of these issues.
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PTSD Factor Structure
The DSM-IV anxiety disorder work group conceptualized PTSD as a set of symptoms
from three categories: reexperiencing, avoidance/numbing, and hyperarousal. Foa, Riggs, and
Gershuny (1995) did find three factors corresponding to DSM criteria in a sample of 158 female
assault survivors, but this study has been criticized for its small sample size (Taylor, Kuch,
Koch, Crockett, & Passey, 1998). The majority of studies, however, fail to replicate the threefactor model proposed in the DSM even though they all use measures based directly on the 17symptom DSM conceptualization of PTSD (e.g., Asmundson et al., 2000, King & King, 1994,
Taylor et al., 1998).
Some studies support a two-factor structure of PTSD. A solution with intrusion and
avoidance symptoms loading on the first factor and numbing and arousal symptoms loading on
the second factor has been found in samples of 103 motor vehicle accident survivors and 419
United Nations peacekeepers exposed to political violence (Taylor et al., 1998) and 217 motor
vehicle accident victims (Buckley, Clanchard, & Hickling, 1998). A variant of the two-factor
model with depression and avoidance symptoms loading onto the first factor and anxiety and
arousal symptoms loading onto the second factor was found in a sample of 185 victims of either
a fire or a motor vehicle accident (Maes et al., 1998).
The majority of studies, however, support a 4-factor model of PTSD. Two variants of a 4factor model have been supported in the literature. The first includes four intercorrelated factors
(with or without a single higher-order factor) of reexperiencing, effortful avoidance, emotional
numbing, and arousal symptoms. The four-factor intercorrelated model without a higher-order
factor has been found in many large samples (ns = 148 to 1218), including persons with PTSD
from a nationally representative population survey (McWilliams, Cox, & Asmundson, 2005),
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male veterans (King, Leskin, King, & Weathers, 1998), male United Nations peacekeepers
(Asmundson, Wright, McCreary, & Pedlar, 2003), injured survivors of community violence
(Marshall, 2004), women who reported sexual harassment (Palmieri & Fitzgerald, 2005), cancer
survivors (DuHamel et al., 2004), and women with Stage II or III breast cancer (Shelby et al.,
2005). A four-factor intercorrelated model with a higher-order factor was also found in several
samples, including accident survivors in a primary care setting (Asmundson et al., 2000), several
samples of veterans (King & King, 1994), and hurricane survivors (Norris, Perilla, & Murphy,
2001).
The second four-factor model of PTSD supported in the literature departs even more
from the DSM symptom structure than the previously mentioned four-factor model, with a
dysphoria component in addition to factors representing reexperiencing, avoidance, and arousal
symptoms. In this model, the hypervigilance and exaggerated startle response symptoms
comprise the hyperarousal factor, and the remaining hyperarousal symptoms along with the
emotional numbing symptoms form the dysphoria factor. Support for this model has been
reported in 3695 Gulf War veterans and non-deployed controls (Simms, Watson, & Boebbeling,
2002), 528 Western New York University undergraduates following the September 11 th World
Trade Center attacks (Baschnagel, O’Connor, Colder, & Hawk, 2005), 1116 motor vehicle
accident survivors (Elklit & Shevlin, 2007), and 429 undergraduates exposed to a variety of
traumatic events (Hoyt & Yeater, 2007). McWilliams et al. (2005) conducted a follow-up
principal components analysis following the failure of their best model of four intercorrelated
factors (reexperiencing, avoidance, numbing, and hyperarousal) to meet all of the goodness-of-fit
criteria. Their analysis yielded a four-factor solution of dysphoria, cued reexperiencing and
avoidance, uncued reexperiencing and hyperarousal, and trauma-related rumination. Finally, a
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smaller study (n = 195) of male combat veterans revealed four factors of intrusion, effortful
avoidance, sleep disturbance, and emotional numbing (Amdur & Liberzon, 2001).
All of the four-factor models specify that avoidance and numbing represent separate,
distinct factors. Foa, Zinbarg, and Rothbaum’s (1992) formulation of PTSD proposes that
arousal symptoms produce numbing symptoms, whereas avoidance symptoms occur in response
to reexperiencing symptoms. Consistent with Foa et al.’s conceptualization of the relationships
between symptom clusters, hierarchical multiple regression analyses have demonstrated that
arousal symptoms do indeed explain the majority of the variance in numbing, and reexperiencing
symptoms do explain the majority of the variance in avoidance symptoms in rape survivors
(Feuer, Nishith, & Resick, 2005; Tull & Roemer, 2003) and in combat veterans (Litz et al.,
1997). However, only longitudinal studies can address the direction of causality implied by Foa
et al.
Other symptom groupings are possible but have not been explicitly tested. Ford (1999)
and Herman (1992) suggest that severe, chronic traumatization may be associated with “complex
PTSD” responses of affect and impulse dysregulation, dissociation, somatization, and altered
sense of self and relationships. This symptom clustering differs dramatically from the DSM
conceptualization of PTSD and would require the use of new measurement instruments that are
not based on the current DSM model of PTSD.
As the bulk of studies support a four-factor model, future studies should assess these
variants to determine the model that best fits the majority of the data so that the diagnostic
criteria can be revised in future versions of the DSM.
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PTSD and Non-criterion A Events
The DSM-IV recognizes that some people develop symptoms suggestive of PTSD after
stressors that do not meet criterion A (APA, 1994). Although the diagnostic guidelines instruct
clinicians and researchers to diagnose an adjustment disorder in these cases, some researchers
question whether the symptoms of PTSD are necessarily caused by trauma (e.g., Bodkin, Pope,
Detke, & Hudson, 2007).
In the National Comorbidity Survey, only a slight increase in lifetime rates of PTSD was
observed when non-criterion A events were included (Kessler et al., 1995). The estimated
lifetime prevalence of PTSD rose from 7.8% to 8.4% with the inclusion of non-criterion A
events. Studies among clinical populations, however, tend to show a higher prevalence of PTSD
in association with non-criterion A events than epidemiological studies. A study of 45 persons
with social anxiety disorder and 30 nonanxious controls found that one third of the socially
anxious individuals met the symptom criteria for PTSD in response to an extremely stressful
social event that did not meet criterion A (Erwin, Heimberg, Marx, & Franklin, 2005). Further,
for the 29 participants who reported the presence of a criterion A event and a socially stressful
event, similar numbers of reexperiencing and avoidance symptoms were reported for both
events, but greater hyperarousal symptoms were reported for their worst socially stressful event
compared to their worst criterion A event. This finding suggests that, for persons with social
anxiety, socially stressful events may be experienced subjectively as quite traumatic. Similarly,
in a study of 103 persons seeking treatment for Major Depressive Disorder, 78% of persons with
a criterion A event (n = 54) qualified for PTSD; however, 78% of those who did not report a
criterion A event also qualified for PTSD in every way except for the criterion A requirement
(Bodkin et al., 2007). In response to their findings, Bodkin and colleagues encourage caution in
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attributing PTSD symptoms to trauma in a treatment-seeking population. PTSD symptoms have
been observed after divorce (Helzer, Robins, & McEvoy, 1987), extramarital affairs (Attilio,
2004), sexual harassment (Avina & O’Donohue, 2002), and financial difficulties (Scott &
Stradling, 1994). These findings suggest that symptoms attributed to PTSD may be non-specific
and common to persons experiencing stressful or traumatic events, especially those with mood
and anxiety disorders.
The non-specificity of PTSD symptoms to a qualifying criterion A event leads to the
question of why some people develop PTSD-like symptoms after events that are stressful, but
not categorized as traumatic. Kessler and colleagues (1995) propose that a broad-based
investigation is needed to determine which types of nonqualifying events are most likely to
produce PTSD-like symptoms and which persons may be especially vulnerable to developing
PTSD symptoms following subthreshold events. This study addressed this issue by examining
the relative contribution of event and person characteristics in PTSD symptoms following events
that do and do not meet criterion A.
Severity of trauma exposure is an important component of the diagnostic guidelines for
PTSD, but evidence of PTSD-like responses to lower magnitude events causes some to question
the assumption that PTSD should only be diagnosed for high magnitude events (e.g., Bodkin et
al., 2007). Of interest are the relative influences of event and person characteristics in predicting
responses to low and high severity events. It is possible that person characteristics are more
powerful predictors of PTSD in response to less severe events than they are to high severity
events. The sections that follow will review characteristics of events and person factors that
predict PTSD symptom severity.
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Event Characteristics and PTSD
Specific characteristics of an event influence the probability that the event will lead to
PTSD. Certain events are associated more consistently with PTSD than are other events. Even
within event categories, traumas vary according to the degree of perceived life threat, extent of
physical injury, duration, and, in interpersonal crimes, the victim’s relationship to the offender.
Additionally, the social support perceived by the individual in association with the event often
varies between and within event categories.
Event Type
Events differ in their capacity to produce PTSD. According to data from the National
Comorbidity Survey, rape is the event associated with the highest conditional probability of
developing PTSD among men and women; sixty-five percent of men and 45.9% of women who
reported rape as their most upsetting trauma developed PTSD (Kessler et al., 1995). Other
traumas associated with a high probability of PTSD in this epidemiological study include combat
exposure, childhood neglect, and childhood physical abuse among men (with PTSD probabilities
of 38.8%, 23.9%, and 22.3%, respectively). Among women, in addition to rape, events
associated with a high probability of PTSD were childhood physical abuse, being threatened with
a weapon, sexual molestation, and physical assault (with PTSD probabilities of 48.5%, 32.6%,
26.5%, and 21.3%, respectively). In contrast, events with a low probability of producing PTSD
in men are physical assault (1.8%), being threatened with a weapon (1.9%), natural disaster or
fire (3.7%), being shocked by the traumatization of a close acquaintance (4.4%), being in an
accident (6.3%), and witnessing someone being killed or badly injured (6.4%). Among women,
events with a low probability of producing PTSD are natural disaster or fire (5.4%), witnessing
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someone being killed or badly injured (7.5%), being in an accident (8.8%), and being shocked by
the traumatization of someone close (10.4%).
With a few exceptions in men, PTSD tends to be most highly associated with direct
exposure to interpersonal violence (e.g., rape, physical and sexual abuse, combat exposure, and
physical assault or threat with a weapon for women). Less likely to produce PTSD are events
that are not directly experienced (e.g., witnessing someone being killed or badly injured, being
shocked at the traumatization of another person) and events that are not of an interpersonal
nature (e.g., natural disasters, accidents).
Different rates of PTSD for different events have led some researchers to compare the
experience of PTSD in different events. Studies suggest that different types of events may be
associated with different PTSD symptoms. For example, Solomon and Canino (1990) found that
victims of a flood and/or unsafe dioxin levels had more reexperiencing and arousal symptoms
than avoidance and numbing symptoms. This finding may be partially explained by avoidance
coping literature that suggests that avoidance is adaptive in the short-term for some events, such
as rape and childhood sexual abuse, but harmful in the long-term (Coffey, Leitenberg, Henning,
Turner, & Bennett, 1996), whereas avoidance may be more maladaptive in the short-term but
adaptive in the long-term for other events, such as witnessing someone being killed or seriously
injured and surviving life-threatening accidents (Creamer, Burgess, & Pattison, 1992). This
pattern suggests that symptom clusters of PTSD may be different for different events, with
avoidance symptoms predicting PTSD for interpersonal events but not other events.
Others suggest that responses to multiple, prolonged, or intermittent potentially traumatic
events may differ both quantitatively (e.g., PTSD symptom count) and qualitatively (e.g.,
different PTSD factor structure) from responses to discrete traumatic events (Gurevich, Devins,
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& Rodin, 2002). Discrete trauma may include events such as rape, natural disasters, accidents,
and single assaults, whereas chronic traumas include events such as war experiences, domestic
violence, childhood abuse, and life-threatening illnesses.
Although more research needs to be done before it can be determined whether PTSD
should be categorized and researched separately for interpersonal versus other events, recent
studies suggest that event characteristics are important in the development and experience of
PTSD. The results of the aforementioned studies support comparing events on chronicity and
degree of interpersonal involvement.
Life Threat
The degree of perceived life threat has been found in numerous studies to predict a
diagnosis of PTSD and symptom severity. Perceived life threat was positively associated with
PTSD symptom severity in several studies of women who reported sexual abuse in childhood or
rape (Resnick, Kilpatrick, Dansky, Saunders, & Best, 1993; Ullman & Filipas, 2001) and
survivors of serious motor vehicle accidents (Blanchard, Hickling, Mitnick, Taylor, Loos, &
Buckley, 1995; Delahanty, Raimonde, Spoonster, & Cullado, 2003). Ozer et al.’s (2003) metaanalysis of predictors of PTSD in adults revealed a weighted average correlation of .26 (total n =
3,524) between degree of perceived life threat and PTSD symptoms. They found the link
between perceived life threat and PTSD symptoms to be stronger for non-combat interpersonal
violence (weighted r = .36) than for serious accidents (r = .20).
Degree of Physical Injury
The relationship between degree of physical injury and PTSD or posttraumatic stress
symptom severity is more variable. Several studies find no relationship between physical injury
and PTSD diagnosis. In a sample of 138 victims of physical assault, degree of physical injury at
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the time of the assault was not a significant predictor of PTSD diagnosis (Johansen, Wahl,
Eilertsen, Hanestad, & Weisaeth, 2006). Delahanty et al.’s (2003) sample of motor vehicle
accident survivors demonstrated lower objective injury severity scores among those with PTSD
than those without PTSD. However, Blanchard et al.’s (1995) study of motor vehicle accident
survivors found significant positive relationships between injury severity and a PTSD diagnosis
(r = .30) and PTSD symptom count (r = .31). Similarly, degree of physical injury during sexual
assault predicted the development of PTSD from the event (Kilpatrick, Saunders, AmickMcMullan, Best, Veronen, & Resnick, 1989). It is important to note that the studies using
samples of motor vehicle accident survivors (e.g., Blanchard et al.; Delahanty et al.) used
physician ratings of injury severity, whereas the studies of physical and sexual assault survivors
(e.g., Johansen et al., 2006; Kilpatrick et al., 1989) used participants’ self-ratings of physical
injury. Results are still mixed even within each type of assessment (self-report versus physician
rating) and event type, so research currently does not definitively support a relationship between
physical injury and PTSD. Perception of life threat appears to be more important in the genesis
of PTSD than extent of physical injury.
Event Duration
Few studies directly test the relationship between event duration and PTSD, but there is
some evidence that traumas of longer duration are more likely to produce PTSD or be associated
with greater symptom severity. Direct evidence of this association was found in a study of
Vietnam veterans, in which longer direct combat exposure was associated with a higher
prevalence of PTSD and more persistent PTSD symptoms (Buydens-Branchey & Noumair,
1990). The strong evidence for the dose-response relationship between trauma and PTSD
reviewed later in this paper (see “prior trauma history” section) also supports the notion that
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event duration may partially explain differences in PTSD rates between events (e.g., single motor
vehicle accident versus childhood physical abuse) and differences in PTSD development within
event categories (e.g., a single act of sexual molestation versus several years of abuse). It could
be argued that event duration simply reflects instances of acute or discrete versus chronic
exposure, with more discrete exposure observed in motor vehicle accidents, fires, and physical
and sexual assaults, and more chronic exposure observed in childhood abuse, combat exposure,
and domestic violence. Duration of exposure should be examined and tested in relationship to
PTSD in the events most clearly associated with chronic exposure to determine if duration does
in fact predict PTSD symptom severity.
Relationship to Offender
Among traumas involving interpersonal events, several studies suggest that sexual
assaults by strangers and relatives are related to greater PTSD symptomology than are assaults
by acquaintances and romantic partners (Bownes, O’Gorman, & Sayers, 1991; Ullman, Filipas,
Townsend, & Starzynski, 2006). Several studies have found stranger assaults to be more violent,
produce greater physical injury, and to be associated with higher ratings of perceived life threat
than assaults by persons known to the victim (Koss, Dinero, Seibel, & Cox, 1988; Ullman et al.).
For interpersonal events, therefore, the relationship of the victim to the offender should be
included in the assessment and analysis of risk factors for PTSD symptoms.
Perceived Social Support
Several studies suggest that there is a positive correlation between the stressfulness of an
event and the amount of perceived support (e.g., Dunkel-Schetter, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1987;
Hobfoll & Lerman, 1989; Kaniasty & Norris, 1991), suggesting a potential moderating effect of
received support on the relationship between trauma exposure and PTSD reactions. Consistent
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with this theory, social support has been inversely related to PTSD symptoms in female assault
victims (Hyman, Gold, & Cott, 2003, Kramer & Green, 1991; Schumm, Briggs-Phillips, &
Hobfoll, 2006; Wolfe, Sharkansky, Read, Dawson, Martin, & Ouimette, 1998), Israeli victims of
terrorism (Hobfall, Canetti-Nisim, Johnson, Palmieri, Varley, & Galea, 2008), hurricane
survivors (Acierno, Ruggiero, Kilpatrick, Resnick, & Galea, 2006), combat veterans (Green &
Berlin, 1987; King, King, Foy, Keane, & Fairbank, 1999; Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfall,
1987; Sutker, Davis, Uddo, & Ditta, 1995), burn victims (Perry, Difede, Musngi, Frances, &
Jacobsberg, 1992), and battered women (Astin, Lawrence, & Foy, 1993; Perrin, Van Hasselt,
Basilio, & Hersen, 1996). The receipt of social support may differ according to event
characteristics, however. Eckenrode and Wethington (1990) suggest that events that are
unambiguously traumatic and visibly distressing are more likely to facilitate supportive
responses from others. On the other hand, events that involve stigma, blame, and uncertainty
about whether trauma occurred may be associated with less social support (Kaniasty & Norris,
1993). This study assessed the role of self-reported receipt of social support associated with
participants’ worst events in the prediction of PTSD symptoms.
Event Characteristics Summary
To summarize the state of the literature on the relationships among event characteristics
and PTSD, there is strong evidence for a link between PTSD and event type, degree of perceived
life threat, and relationship to offender in interpersonal traumas (e.g., rape). Rape, combat
exposure, and childhood abuse are consistently associated with higher conditional probabilities
of developing PTSD (e.g., Kessler et al., 1995), and interpersonal events are more likely to
produce PTSD than non-interpersonal events (e.g., natural disasters, motor vehicle accidents,
etc.). Perceived life threat is consistently positively associated with PTSD severity (e.g., Resnick
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et al., 1993). Also, there is evidence that sexual assaults by strangers or relatives are more likely
to result in PTSD than are assaults by acquaintances and romantic partners (e.g., Bownes et al.,
1991). Finally, perceived social support in response to events is associated with fewer PTSD
symptoms. All of these factors partially explain the development of PTSD in the sense that more
severe events are associated with greater rates of PTSD. Of interest, however, is the relationship
of person characteristics to the development of PTSD, as these variables can be used to explain
why some persons develop PTSD to less severe events (i.e., events that do not satisfy criterion
A) and some persons never develop PTSD after severe events.
Person Characteristics and PTSD
Research has demonstrated that rates of PTSD are different in different groups of people.
Factors such as sex, age, socioeconomic status, and previous history of trauma exposure
influence risk of both trauma exposure and the development of PTSD.
Sex
Epidemiological studies confirm sex differences in rates of exposure to certain types of
events and in the prevalence of PTSD after particular events. Overall, in the United States,
women are more than twice as likely as men to develop PTSD at some point in their lives (10.4%
versus 5%), although fewer women than men report exposure to a traumatic event in their
lifetime (51.2% versus 60.7%; Kessler et al., 1995). Similarly, an epidemiological study in
Australia found that 64.6% of men and 49.5% of women reported the occurrence of at least one
traumatic event in their lifetime, but 12-month PTSD prevalence rates did not differ
significantly, with 1.2% of males and 1.4% of females qualifying for a diagnosis of PTSD in the
year prior to the study (Creamer, Burgess, & McFarlane, 2001). Both Kessler et al. and Creamer
et al. reported that women were more likely to develop PTSD than men given exposure to most
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event categories. Kessler et al. found that 8.1% of men and 20.4% of women who had
experienced a traumatic event met PTSD criteria at some point in their lifetime, whereas
Creamer et al.’s study found lower rates for men 1.9% and 2.9% women.
Sex differences in PTSD rates following trauma exposure have been explained in several
different ways. Women are more likely than men to experience “high risk” traumas that have a
high probability of producing PTSD (with the exception of combat exposure), such as rape and
sexual abuse (Creamer et al., 2001; Kessler et al., 1995). In fact, the narrower gap between the
sexes in the Australian sample compared to the North American sample may be partially
explained by the lower rate of reported rape among Australian women (5.4%; Creamer et al.)
than American women (9.2%; Kessler et al.).
Another explanation for sex differences in PTSD relates to the greater prevalence of
mood and other anxiety disorders in women than in men (Andrews, Henderson, & Hall, 2001;
APA, 2000; Cwikel, Zilber, Feinson, & Lerner, 2008; Kessler et al., 1995). History of other
psychiatric disorders is a known risk factor in the development of PTSD following trauma
exposure (Breslau, Davis, Andreski, Peterson, & Schultz, 1997; Kessler et al., 1995).
A final issue in regard to sex differences in rates of PTSD relates to criterion A2 (i.e.,
response of intense fear, helplessness, or horror). Several studies suggest that, given an event that
satisfies criterion A1, women are more likely than men to fulfill criterion A2 (Breslau & Kessler,
2001; Brewin et al., 2000). Studies examining sex differences in rates of PTSD tend to restrict
the definition of trauma to criterion A1 instead of using the full 2-part definition to determine
trauma exposure rates.
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Age
There is mixed evidence regarding the association of age with PTSD. Lifetime trauma
exposure is significantly and positively associated with age among persons in the United States
(Kessler et al., 1995), but Creamer et al. found that Australians over age 55 were less likely to
report exposure to a criterion A event than younger cohorts. Consistent with North American
findings, however, Creamer et al. (2001) found that persons between 25 and 54 were more likely
than 18- to 24-year-olds to report at least one traumatic event. They suggested that a problem
with examining the relationship between age and trauma exposure is that underreporting of
traumatic experiences may increase among older adults due to length of time since
traumatization and declining memory. Despite the general tendency for trauma exposure to
increase with age, there is not a significant relationship between age and lifetime PTSD among
those who reported trauma exposure (Kessler et al.). In fact, adults over 55 are less likely than
adults younger than 55 to meet criteria for PTSD in the 12-months prior to the assessment
(Creamer et al.). Although it has not been explicitly tested in these epidemiological studies, it is
likely that length of time since the occurrence of one’s “worst trauma” would be inversely
related to current diagnoses of PTSD. Many persons recover from PTSD over time; median time
to remission is 36 months among those who obtain treatment and 64 months among those who
do not receive treatment (Kessler et al.). Interestingly, however, several studies of women who
experienced a sexual assault suggest that time since assault does not predict PTSD
symptomology (Ullman & Filipas, 2001; Ullman et al., 2006). Unlike the epidemiological
studies mentioned earlier, these latter studies did not determine PTSD diagnoses; rather, they
used symptom counts. Given remission rates of PTSD over time, it is likely (although untested in
these studies) that time since event does in fact relate to PTSD diagnostic status.
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Socioeconomic Status
Evidence on the relationship between socioeconomic status and PTSD is mixed.
Epidemiological studies in the United States (e.g., Keane et al., 1995) and Australia (e.g.,
Creamer et al., 2001) show no association between PTSD diagnoses and education when
controlling for other demographic variables, such as age, sex, and marital status. There is some
evidence, however, that persons with lower levels of education may report a greater number of
PTSD symptoms. For example, in a community-based survey of young adults exposed to a major
brush fire in Australia, education was inversely related to number of PTSD symptoms (Parslow,
Jorm, & Christensen, 2006). PTSD symptom count was also inversely related to education
(Sutker, Bugg, & Allain, 1990; Ursano, Boydstun, & Wheatley, 1981) and socioeconomic status
(Sutker et al.; Tennant, Goulston, & Dent, 1986) in prisoners of war. Similarly, education was
negatively correlated with number of PTSD symptoms in female sexual assault survivors
(Ullman & Filipas, 2001). Psychiatric diagnosis in general, including diagnoses of PTSD, were
predicted by less education, less income, and unemployment in a sample of 976 primary care
patients in Israel (Cwikel et al., 2008). Although the link between socioeconomic status and
PTSD is unclear, the majority of studies use education as a marker of socioeconomic status
rather than income (e.g., Creamer et al.; Keane et al.; Parslow et al.; Ullman & Filipas; Ursano et
al.). The studies that assess and report income as a marker of socioeconomic status uniformly
find income to be negatively associated with PTSD symptoms (e.g., Cwikel et al.; Sutker et al.;
Tennant et al.).
Prior Trauma History
A dose-response effect between number of traumas and likelihood of developing PTSD is
well-established in the literature. Persons with a history of multiple traumas, whether different
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types or related events, are more likely to develop PTSD than are persons who have experienced
a single traumatic event (e.g., Breslau & Kessler, 2001; Kessler et al., 1995). In a sample of 212
undocumented immigrants, the odds of meeting diagnostic criteria for PTSD increased by 1.31
for each traumatic event reported (Rasmussen et al., 2007). Women who have been raped who
have a previous history of assault had a 6.7 times greater likelihood of developing PTSD
following the rape than women who did not have a previous history of sexual assault (Resnick,
Yehuda, Pitman, & Foy, 1995). Similarly, a study of victims of a serious motor vehicle accident
found that persons who met PTSD criteria reported more prior traumatic events than those who
did not develop PTSD (Delahanty et al., 2003). Finally, in a meta-analysis of 23 studies that
assessed trauma histories of persons with and without PTSD, a weighted correlation of .17 was
obtained between number of prior traumas and PTSD symptoms following a selected event
(Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). Ozer et al. noted that the presence of prior traumas was
more strongly related to PTSD when the prior trauma involved non-combat interpersonal
violence (e.g., assault, rape, domestic violence; weighted r = .27) than when the prior traumas
were combat-related (weighted r = .18) or involved serious accidents (weighted r = .12).
Person Characteristics Summary
In sum, personal risk factors for PTSD are female sex and having a history of prior
traumatic events (Kessler et al., 1995). The research on the relationship between age and PTSD
suggests that generally age is unrelated to PTSD (e.g., Kessler et al.), but there may be a lower
prevalence rate of PTSD in adults over the age of 55 (Creamer et al., 2001). Evidence on the
relationship between PTSD and education is inconsistent, but there is limited evidence for a
negative association between household income and PTSD symptom severity (e.g., Cwikel et al.,
2008).
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Cognitive Characteristics and PTSD
Certain cognitive variables may play a role in the etiology, maintenance, and remission of
PTSD. Cognitive models of PTSD suggest that faulty emotional processing of traumatic events is
a key factor in the etiology of PTSD (e.g., Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum; Horowitz, 1976).
Cognitive avoidance strategies prevent emotional memories from consolidating and being
assimilated into existing cognitive schemas (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Horowitz, 1976). It has been
theorized that trauma-related information may not be incorporated into existing schemas when it
does not fit into relatively rigid patterns (Wells, 2000). Additionally, the role of perceived
helplessness or lack of control over outcomes has been deemed influential in the etiology of
PTSD (e.g., Mikulincer and Solomon, 1988; Seligman, 1975).
The cognitive models of PTSD suggest that certain general ways of thinking about the
world as well as specific beliefs related to events that are experienced should be related to PTSD
symptoms. Specifically, worry and rumination as well as experiential avoidance should be risk
factors for the development of PTSD symptoms because of their role in avoidance, which may
prevent memory consolidation. Benefit-finding and core beliefs should relate to PTSD because
each influences the assimilation of trauma-related information into existing schemas. Finally,
hardiness and self-efficacy should be negatively associated with PTSD symptoms due to their
association with perception of control and ability to cope with traumatic events. It is likely that
these variables will also predict PTSD symptoms following events that do not satisfy criterion A;
in fact, cognitive factors may explain PTSD symptoms in response to less severe events better
than event characteristics do. For example, it might be possible to compare the magnitude of the
relationship between these cognitive factors and PTSD symptom severity among those with a
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qualifying event with those who do not have a qualifying event. See Figure 1 for a diagram
depicting the proposed relationship between cognitive variables and cognitive models of PTSD.
Worry and Rumination
Cognitive models of PTSD stipulate that emotional processing of traumatic events is
hindered by avoidant cognitive strategies (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989; Roussis &
Wells, 2005). Emotional processing of traumatic events has been defined as the manipulation in
working memory of representations of past and potential events and associated bodily states
(Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996). Horowitz’s (1976) information-processing model of PTSD
explains intrusive thoughts, memories, and feelings as an effort to assimilate trauma-related
information into existing cognitive schemas. Wells’ (2000) metacognitive model of PTSD
maintenance extends this theory and posits that successful emotional processing of a traumatic
event requires flexible thought processes, whereas rumination and worry are relatively inflexible
in preventing the incorporation of new, nonthreatening information into a person’s schema.
Rumination and worry serve an avoidant function in the aftermath of trauma by keeping a
person’s focus on a narrow piece of the experience (as in rumination) or on a potential future
experience (as in worry).
Rumination refers to repetitive and recurrent negative thinking about past experiences,
whereas worry involves repetitive and recurrent thoughts about potential negative events
(Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2007). Although rumination is more past-oriented whereas
worry is more future-oriented, both phenomena inhibit the incorporation of positive information
into one’s perspective. Rumination among persons with PTSD has been found to involve “why”
and “what if” questions (Michael et al.) that are peripheral to the trauma experience itself and
prevent full emotional involvement in processing the experience in its entirety. Thinking about
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Cognitive Models of PTSD

Theory: Avoidance keeps
memories from
consolidating (e.g., Ehlers
& Clark, 2000; Foa et al.,
1989).

Worry and
rumination

Experiential
avoidance

Theory: Information is not
consistent with pre-existing
cognitive schemas and is not
incorporated adequately (e.g.,
Janoff-Bulman,1989; Wells,
2000).

BenefitFinding

Core
Beliefs

Theory: Helplessness and
perception of no control
lead to inadequate coping
(e.g., Mikulincer &
Solomon, 1988;
Seligman, 1975).

Hardiness

Selfefficacy

Figure 1. Cognitive Variables Related to Cognitive Models of PTSD
causes and consequences of an event results in the avoidance of reliving the event and thereby
interferes with consolidation of trauma memories (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Similarly, worry is
conceptualized as a thought control strategy (e.g., Roussis & Wells, 2005) by involving a focus
on events that have not actually happened as opposed to processing the event that did happen.
Several studies support the role of rumination and worry in PTSD maintenance.
Rumination as assessed within 3 months of a physical or sexual assault was positively associated
with PTSD severity six months later (Michael et al., 2007). Steil and Ehlers (2000) conducted
two studies with survivors of serious motor vehicle accidents and found that rumination was
positively correlated with PTSD symptom severity (partial correlations of .27 to .56) even after
controlling for frequency of intrusive memories, accident severity, and several other cognitive
variables. Ehlers, Mayou, and Bryant (1998) similarly found that rumination and a general
tendency to worry at 3 months after a motor vehicle accident predicted PTSD symptom severity
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and diagnosis at 3 months and also again at one year after the accident. These studies suggest
that rumination and worry may play a role in the etiology of PTSD as well as in the maintenance
of PTSD over the course of a year after the identified event. In another sample of survivors of
serious motor vehicle accidents, scores on a measure of general tendency to worry given to
participants within one month of the accident significantly contributed to the later development
of PTSD (Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 2001). Roussis and Wells’ (2006) cross-sectional study of
posttraumatic stress symptoms in college students who reported exposure to a broad array of
traumatic events also revealed a significant, positive relationship between worry and PTSD
symptoms. Regardless of the function of worry and rumination as avoidance strategies after
traumatic events, they are consistently associated with greater PTSD symptom severity.
Experiential Avoidance
Avoidance may take different forms, such as cognitive, emotional, and behavioral, and
may be relegated to very specific instances or may manifest as a chronic phenomenon when it is
used as a general coping strategy for managing difficult emotions. Experiential avoidance has
been described as encompassing cognitive, emotional, and behavioral aspects of avoidance in
response to specific memories or situations.
Experiential avoidance is the phenomenon that occurs when a person is unwilling
to remain in contact with particular private experiences (e.g., bodily sensations,
emotions, thoughts, memories, behavioral predispositions) and takes steps to alter
the form or frequency of these events and the contexts that occasion them.
(Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996, p. 1154).
Whether used situationally or habitually, avoidance of trauma-related cues seems to play
a role in the development and maintenance of PTSD. Hayes et al. (1996) postulate that
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experiential avoidance may be harmful because thoughts and feelings are often paradoxically
increased by deliberate control efforts. In addition, avoidance can interfere with adaptive life
functioning and with the process of healthy behavioral change. Evidence for the harmful effects
of avoidance postulated by Hayes et al. is mixed. Studies using measures of thought suppression
are generally supportive of the prediction that avoidance has negative consequences. Thought
suppression has been conceptualized as a process that involves a conscious, effortful search for
distracters, and an unconscious monitoring process that searches for the unwanted thought
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Thought suppression has been shown to be related to
hypersensitivity to depressing and anxiety-provoking thoughts, demonstrating significant
positive correlations of weak to moderate strength with depression, obsessive-compulsive
symptoms, trait anxiety, and sensitivity to anxiety (Wegner & Zanakos). Thought suppression is
also stable over time (test-retest correlations range from .69 to .92; Wegner & Zanakos),
suggesting that persons may exhibit a general tendency to engage in this process.
Few studies have assessed for the use of thought suppression in trauma survivors, but
Wegner and Zanakos’ (1994) finding that thought suppression is related to anxiety sensitivity
implies that the use of thought suppression may be positively associated with PTSD symptoms,
particularly intrusive symptoms. Consistent with this expectation, Steil and Ehlers (2000) found
that thought suppression indeed correlated positively with PTSD symptom severity in two
samples of motor vehicle accident survivors. Partial correlations ranged from .34 to .36 when the
relationship between thought suppression and PTSD symptoms was controlled for frequency of
intrusive memories, accident severity, and other cognitive variables. In a sample of
undergraduate students who reported no trauma history, Davies and Clark (1998) showed
participants either a distressing film about a natural disaster or a neutral film about polar bears.
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They found a rebound effect (i.e., an increase of target thoughts compared to baseline after a
period of suppression) following instructed thought suppression for those exposed to the
distressing film but not for those exposed to the neutral film. The authors suggested that
emotionally charged material is more susceptible to a rebound effect following suppression than
is less emotionally charged material, supporting the theory that avoidance of trauma-related
stimuli may not work well in the long-term and lead to an increase in trauma-related intrusive
thoughts and feelings.
Several experimental studies have examined the effects of induced thought suppression in
persons exposed to traumatic events. Results differ depending on the type of sample and length
of time since the traumatic event. Harvey and Bryant (1998) compared inpatient motor vehicle
accident victims with (n = 24) and without (n = 24) acute stress disorder (ASD). Both groups
showed a rebound in trauma-related thoughts in the time period (5 minutes) after the block of
time (5 minutes) when they were instructed to suppress the thoughts. Participants who were not
instructed to suppress any thoughts showed no significant difference in the number of traumarelated thoughts from their baseline measurements (5 minute interval before instructed
suppression). Guthrie and Bryant (2000) extended the interval between instructed thought
suppression and follow-up to 24 hours in another sample of inpatients hospitalized for motor
vehicle accident injuries. With the extension of time between suppression and the subsequent
measurement, they found no evidence for a rebound in trauma-related thoughts.
While the relationship between thought suppression and ASD is unclear based on
conflicting results from the two experimental studies of motor vehicle accident survivors, a more
consistent relationship has emerged between thought suppression and chronic PTSD. Shipherd
and Beck (1999) examined deliberate thought suppression in female sexual assault survivors
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with and without chronic PTSD. Sexual assault survivors with chronic PTSD, but not women
without PTSD, showed an increase of trauma-related thoughts after suppression. Shipherd and
Beck (2005) added a condition of instruction to suppress a personally relevant neutral thought in
a sample of survivors of serious motor vehicle accidents. They found that persons with PTSD
showed a rebound effect following suppression of trauma-related thoughts but not after
suppression of neutral thoughts. The non-PTSD group did not experience a rebound effect after
suppressing either neutral or trauma-related thoughts. Conflicting results were obtained,
however, in a sample of 44 PTSD-positive and 26 PTSD-negative survivors of serious motor
vehicle accidents, with both groups showing a rebound in trauma-related thoughts following
deliberate thought suppression (Beck, Gudmundsdottir, Palyo, Miller, & Grant, 2006). This
sample, unlike the others, included only help-seeking individuals from a university-based clinic,
all of whom were seeking therapy for emotional distress related to their motor vehicle accident.
Thought suppression may play a role in the maintenance of PTSD symptoms and generalized
trauma-related distress (without full-blown PTSD) following a trauma.
Studies of more general avoidance than thought suppression tend to find avoidance to be
adaptive in the immediate aftermath of a trauma and harmful when it is more long-term.
According to theory, avoidance coping allows persons to confront their experiences in
manageable doses in the short-term aftermath of a trauma but interferes with emotional
processing in the long-term (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Ruth & Cohen, 1986). Avoidance in
terms of suppressing negative thoughts and keeping busy have been found to be associated with
less distress immediately following a rape (Frazier & Burnett, 1994), whereas avoidance coping
at least one year after a rape has been found to predict PTSD symptoms (Coffey et al., 1996;
Ullman, 1996). Boeschen, Koss, Figueredo, and Coan (2001) used structural equation modeling
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to model the pathways by which certain cognitive variables affect PTSD in 139 rape survivors.
They found that experiential avoidance was related to PTSD symptom severity through its
association with behavioral self-blame (i.e., blaming one’s own behaviors for the event, such as
“I should not have walked home alone”). Experiential avoidance had a direct positive effect on
behavioral self-blame, which predicted reexperiencing symptoms of PTSD. Overall, however,
the effect of experiential avoidance was quite small compared to the effect of other cognitive
predictors, such as disrupted beliefs and blame.
In summary, research linking avoidance and PTSD suggests that thought suppression and
long-term use of avoidant coping are associated with increased PTSD symptoms (e.g., Coffey et
al., 1996; Steil & Ehlers, 2000; Ullman, 1996), but these effects may be small in comparison to
the effects of other cognitive processes on the development and maintenance of PTSD (e.g.,
Boeschen et al., 2001).
Benefit-finding
Survivors of traumas sometimes express thoughts that reflect a perception of benefit from
their traumatic experiences. This phenomenon has been reported for a diverse range of traumas,
including disasters (McMillen et al., 1997), rape (Burt & Katz, 1987), heart attacks (Affleck,
Tennen, Croog, & Levine, 1987), child sexual abuse (McMillen, Zuravin, & Rideout, 1995), and
fires (Thompson, 1985). Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) grouped benefits reported from samples
of persons exposed to serious illnesses, severe burns, natural disaster, and rape into three
categories in the development of their Posttraumatic Growth Inventory. They categorized
benefits in terms of positive self-change (e.g., emotional growth, feeling more experienced and
competent), changes in approach to relationships (e.g., closer family relationships, increase in
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self-disclosure), and changes in life philosophy (e.g., increased appreciation for one’s own
existence, change in priorities, stronger religious beliefs).
Several theoretical explanations for benefit-finding and adjustment have been proposed.
Benefit-finding may be an indicator that emotional processing of a trauma has occurred
(McMillen et al., 1997). Cognitive models of PTSD that were discussed earlier (e.g., Horowitz,
1976; Wells, 2000) posit that PTSD occurs when information that conflicts with existing
schemas is diverted from immediate awareness where it causes intrusions and PTSD symptoms
due to its unprocessed status. Benefit-finding, therefore, may represent either an active attempt to
incorporate traumatic material into existing cognitive schemas, or it may reflect an outcome of
adequate processing.
Although benefit-finding tends to be associated with some measures of positive
adjustment (e.g., Affleck et al., 1987; Thompson, 1985), its relationship to PTSD is not
consistently borne out in the literature. McMillen et al. (1997) found that perceived benefit 4 to 6
weeks after exposure to trauma (three samples: tornado, mass killing, and plane crash) predicted
PTSD three years later. In their study, lower perception of benefit increased the odds of having a
diagnosis of PTSD. They found that benefit-finding moderated the effect of the severity of
exposure on mental health diagnoses over time. Without perceived benefit, as exposure severity
increased, the amount of recovery decreased, whereas the opposite trend was present in those
who perceived benefit. The majority of studies, however, find benefit-finding to correlate
positively with some measures of wellbeing but not measures of PTSD. McMillen and Fisher
(1998) found that scales of perceived benefit correlated positively with general perception of
wellbeing but not at all or inversely with mental health symptoms of intrusive symptoms and
depression. The finding that increased benefit finding was inversely related to symptoms
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suggests that the perception of benefit may be triggered by severity of negative symptoms
associated with the stressor. Consistent with this reasoning, Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) found
that more severe traumas were associated with more perceived benefits than were less severe
traumas. In ratings of participants’ worst events, sixty percent of their sample of 604
undergraduates reported positive effects ranging in magnitude from “some” to “extreme,”
whereas 94% reported negative effects ranging in magnitude from “some” to “extreme,”
suggesting that benefit-finding does not represent a denial of harm. With the exception of
McMillen et al.’s study of survivors of a tornado, mass killing, and plane crash, the studies of
benefit-finding and PTSD symptoms do not separate criterion A events from events that, while
perceived as stressful by respondents, do not meet criterion A. Because of the documented
associations between stressor severity and number of benefits reported (e.g., McMillen & Fisher;
Tedeschi & Calhoun) and because of the implications of cognitive conceptualizations of PTSD
that suggest that benefit-finding may represent emotional processing, it is important to assess the
relationship between benefit-finding and PTSD symptoms associated with criterion A events.
Core Beliefs
Cognitive models of PTSD posit that negative beliefs about one’s self, one’s safety, and
the nature of the world after a trauma maintain a sense of ongoing threat (Ehlers & Steil, 1995).
When individuals question their self-worth, their safety, and the benevolence of the world, a
sense of apprehension and uncertainty can emerge, which serves to maintain symptoms of PTSD
(Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 1999). Janoff-Bulman’s (1985, 1989) “shattered assumptions”
conceptualization of trauma reactions suggests that persons who hold more positive beliefs
before a trauma may be most vulnerable to PTSD because of the tremendous incongruence
between their pretrauma cognitive schema and their experience of traumatization. On the other
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hand, Foa and Riggs (1993) argue that negative pretrauma beliefs may also be confirmed by
traumatic events and cause more distress. To reconcile these contrasting theories, Foa and Riggs
and Foa and Rothbaum (1998) suggested that the presence of rigid beliefs that are either overly
optimistic or pessimistic may render persons vulnerable to PTSD, which is consistent with the
literature on worry and rumination (e.g., Wells, 2000). These inflexible patterns of thinking
increase individuals’ vulnerability to psychopathology because they cannot assimilate their
experiences into their worldview.
Epstein (1991) proposed that core beliefs that may change (or be strengthened) after
trauma are beliefs that the world is benign and meaningful, that the self is worthy, and that
people are trustworthy. How individuals interpret the meaning of the trauma affects how they
will assimilate the event into their cognitive schemas and may influence the development of
PTSD (Ehlers & Steil, 1995).
The Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo,
1999) was developed to assess posttraumatic cognitions and has been used in several studies of
trauma survivors. Foa et al. found that all three scales (i.e., negative cognitions about self,
negative cognitions about world, and self-blame) correlated positively with PTSD severity even
after controlling for depression, state anxiety, age, sex, and race.
Studies support the relationship between negative cognitions about self and PTSD. In a
sample of 853 college students (Moser, Hajcak, Simons, & Foa, 2007), only negative cognitions
about self predicted PTSD symptom severity (B = .39) after controlling for sex, negative affect,
and the other two scales of the PTCI (i.e., self-blame and negative cognitions about world). The
role of negative cognitions about self in PTSD was also supported in O’Donnell, Elliott,
Wolfgang, and Creamer’s (2007) sample of 253 injury survivors, in which negative cognitions
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about self predicted PTSD at 3 months post-injury after controlling for acute symptom severity.
Similarly, Startup, Makgekgenene, and Webster (2007) found that high scores on the negative
cognitions of self scale of the PTCI increased the odds of having PTSD by three-fold.
The relationship between negative self-appraisals and PTSD is supported by theories of
PTSD maintenance. As anxiety increases, some persons use avoidant strategies that increase
intrusive and hyperarousal symptoms and thereby confirm one’s negative self-appraisal
(O’Donnell et al., 2007).
The research on the role of self-blame in PTSD is mixed. Greater self-blame is related to
fewer PTSD symptoms in studies of accident survivors (e.g., Delahanty et al., 1997; Hickling,
Blanchard, Buckley, Taylor, 1999; O’Donnell et al., 2007) and greater PTSD symptom severity
in studies of rape and sexual abuse survivors (Frazier, 2003).1
The PTCI scale of negative beliefs about world has not received as much support in its
role in PTSD as negative cognitions about self and self-blame have. It did not relate to PTSD
after controlling for other variables in a sample of college students (Moser et al., 2007) and in a
community sample of persons exposed to a variety of trauma types (Startup et al., 2007).
Negative cognitions about the world may play a role in the maintenance of persistent PTSD,
however. Negative cognitions did not predict PTSD severity at 3 months after an accident but
were stronger predictors of PTSD 12 months post-accident than other cognitive variables were
(i.e., negative cognitions about self and self-blame; O’Donnell et al., 2007).
Other researchers have focused on the perceived change in beliefs following a trauma, as
suggested by Janoff-Bulman’s (1985, 1989) position that trauma can shatter assumptions about
the nature of self and the world. Dunmore et al. (1999) asked 92 survivors of physical or sexual

1

Foa et al. (1999) found higher self-blame predicted PTSD severity, but nearly half of the participants were victims
of sexual assault.
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assault to rate their current beliefs as well as to retrospectively rate their beliefs before their
assault. Beliefs were related to alienation and isolation, being unable to trust others or one’s self,
negativity about core aspects of one’s self, lack of fairness and safety in the world, and negativity
about victims and emotional problems. Persons with current PTSD reported significantly more
negative beliefs both before and after the assault than did the assault survivors without PTSD.
Additionally, those with PTSD showed a significantly greater shift towards holding more
negative beliefs after the assault. The authors of the study also compared persons with a history
of PTSD from the assault who no longer met criteria for PTSD (i.e., recovered group) with those
who currently met criteria in order to determine the role of negative cognitions in the
maintenance of persistent PTSD. The persistent PTSD group (i.e., those who met criteria for
PTSD at the time of the study) reported significantly more negative beliefs after the assault than
the recovered group and exhibited a greater shift towards holding more negative beliefs after the
assault than the recovered group.
In a prospective study, Dunmore, Clark, and Ehlers (2001) found that negative beliefs
after an assault were positively correlated with PTSD severity at entry into the study (within 4
months of the assault) and at 6 months and 9 months post-assault. Negative beliefs before the
assault (i.e., retrospectively reported within four months of the assault) were significant
predictors of PTSD at 6 and 9 months but not at entry and remained significant after controlling
for PTSD severity at entry. When a control group of never assaulted persons was added to the
previous sample, postassault beliefs of the PTSD group were more negative than the beliefs of
the never assaulted and the no-PTSD assault groups (Ali, Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002).
Interestingly, the no-PTSD assault group reported more positive preassault beliefs overall than
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the never assaulted group, suggesting that positive preassault beliefs may play a buffering role
that minimizes the impact of assault.
In summary, core beliefs about self-blame and the nature of one’s self and the world are
theorized to play a role in PTSD development and maintenance when the beliefs are rigid (Foa &
Rothbaum, 1998). The literature clearly supports the relationship between negative appraisals of
one’s self and PTSD (e.g., Moser et al., 2007), but there is mixed evidence for other core beliefs.
Studies currently use belief ratings to predict PTSD symptoms, but the rigidity of these beliefs is
unclear in the current manner of assessment.
Hardiness
Kobasa (1979) introduced the concept of hardiness to describe a characteristic way of
approaching and interpreting experiences in terms of three components: a) commitment (versus
alienation), defined as a sense of purpose and meaning; b) control (versus helplessness), defined
as a sense of autonomy and ability to influence one’s life; and c) challenge (versus threat),
defined as the tendency to perceive changes as opportunities for growth rather than threats to
security. Hardiness is theorized to provide a buffering effect against stress and has been
associated with fewer physical and mental health symptoms (Bartone, Ursano, Wright, &
Ingraham, 1989; Kobasa, Maddi, Puccetti, & Zola, 1985).
Hardiness has been associated with a decreased risk of PTSD following trauma in several
samples of combat veterans. Zakin, Solomon, and Neria (2003) found that hardiness had a direct
main effect on PTSD, with hardiness inversely related to PTSD in a sample of 353 prisons of war
and combat veterans. Hardiness was also found to be inversely related to PTSD symptoms in
both men and women who were Vietnam veterans (King et al., 1999). Taft, Stern, King, and
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King (1999) found that hardiness mediated the relationship between combat exposure and PTSD
in 1632 Vietnam veterans.
Although measures of hardiness are infrequently included in studies with civilian
samples, Kobasa’s (1979) dimensions of commitment, control, and challenge appear in various
forms throughout the literature. Recently, benefit-finding has been studied in relation to PTSD
after trauma (e.g., McMillen et al., 1997) and resembles the commitment and challenge
components of hardiness by its focus on tendencies to find purpose and meaning in traumatic
events and to view hardships as challenges that can result in personal growth and other benefits.
Kobasa’s hardiness dimension of control resembles variables of personal control and selfefficacy assessed in recent studies of trauma survivors (e.g., Benight & Harper, 2002; Regehr,
Cadell, & Jansen, 1999).
Self-efficacy
Cognitive models of PTSD posit that individuals need to emotionally and cognitively
process traumatic events, a process that, when hindered, can result in the development or
maintenance of PTSD symptoms (e.g., Horowitz, 1976; Wells, 2000). Persons differ in their
perceptions about their coping efficacy, however, and perceptions of efficacy may be associated
with resilience. Bandura’s (1997) social-cognitive theory of human behavior states that people
are direct agents who shape and respond to environmental conditions. Coping self-efficacy, or
the perceived capability for managing posttraumatic recovery demands, affects how emotions are
handled and how coping strategies are orchestrated (Benight & Harper, 2002). It has been
theorized that ineffective coping, high levels of emotional distress, and difficult environmental
conditions can decrease perceptions of self-efficacy (Benight & Harper). Low perceptions of
self-efficacy can, in turn, impair coping behaviors by reducing perseverance and the adoption of
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effective coping strategies (Bandura, 1997). Even though self-efficacy may change in response to
circumstances and experiences, there is evidence that some appraisals of self-efficacy arise from
enduring beliefs that people have about themselves (Bandura). Moderate test-retest correlations
(rs ranging from .40 to .68) of self-efficacy at 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month intervals from
baseline have been reported in a sample of HIV-positive men (Chesney, Neilands, Chambers,
Taylor, & Folkman).
Cross-sectional studies of trauma survivors support the status of self-efficacy as a marker
of resilience. Benight et al. (1997) reported that coping self-efficacy accounted for 51% of
variance in PTSD symptoms above and beyond the variance accounted for by threat of death,
CD4 counts (i.e., a measure of immune functioning), estimated damage, income, and education
in a sample of HIV-positive men following Hurricane Andrew. Similar results were obtained in a
study with Oklahoma City bombing survivors, with 28% of the variance in PTSD symptoms
accounted for by coping self-efficacy after controlling for threat of death, income, social support,
and lost resources (Benight et al., 2000). Lower coping self-efficacy has been associated with
worse PTSD symptoms among military samples with PTSD symptoms one year after the
Lebanon war (Solomon, Weisenberg, Schwarzwald, & Mikulincer, 1988) and two years after the
Lebanon war (Solomon, Benbenishty, & Mikulincer, 1991). Enduring beliefs of personal
competence and control were also associated with lower rates of depression and posttraumatic
stress symptoms in a sample of women who had been raped 1 to 11 years prior to their inclusion
in the study (Regehr et al., 1999).
Longitudinal studies also support the role of perceived self-efficacy in resilience. Benight
et al. (1999) conducted a longitudinal causal model analysis on responses from survivors of
Hurricane Andrew and found that coping self-efficacy soon after the hurricane had a direct
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negative pathway to psychological distress soon after the hurricane and also to distress 9 months
later. Benight and Harper (2002) collected data on coping self-efficacy and PTSD from persons
exposed to both a large fire and flash flood within two months of each other. They found that
coping self-efficacy predicted PTSD symptoms at 3 to 8 weeks after the second disaster and also
at 1 year later. They found that coping self-efficacy served as a mediator between acute stress
response (e.g., dissociation, feelings of helplessness, and physiological symptoms of anxiety) at
the time of the trauma and PTSD symptoms one year later. Finally, in a 2-year prospective
follow-up study of firefighters, pretraumatic characteristics of hostility and self-efficacy assessed
immediately after basic training accounted for 42% of the variance in posttraumatic stress
symptoms after two years (Heinrichs et al., 2005). Thus, when taken together, these findings
suggest that low coping self-efficacy is not simply a symptom of PTSD but is causally related to
the emergence of PTSD.
In sum, these studies point to the role of self-efficacy in adaptive coping following
trauma. Persons with greater confidence in their general ability to manage their reactions to
stressful events show lower levels of distress following trauma than persons with lower levels of
self-efficacy.
Cognitive Characteristics Summary
Cognitive risk factors associated with PTSD development or maintenance include worry
and rumination (e.g., Ehlers et al., 1998), thought suppression in PTSD maintenance (e.g., Steil
& Ehlers, 2000), experiential avoidance in chronic PTSD (e.g., Coffey et al., 1996), and negative
core beliefs about one’s self (e.g., Startup et al., 2007). Hardiness and self-efficacy predict
resilience after trauma exposure (e.g., Benight et al., 1997; King et al., 1999), but studies of
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hardiness are confined to military samples. The association between PTSD and benefit-finding,
negative beliefs about the world, and self-blame is not consistently observed.
Summary of Current Study
This study examined the relative contributions of event and personal characteristics in the
maintenance of PTSD symptoms in responses to events that do and do not meet criterion A. 2 The
study tested cognitive models of PTSD that suggest that PTSD symptoms arise from
avoidance (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989), the presence of information
incompatible with pre-existing cognitive schemas (Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Wells, 2000), and the
perception of helplessness (Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988; Seligman, 1975). These predictors
were used in conjunction with event characteristics and person characteristics to predict PTSD
symptoms to events that do and do not meet criterion A1. Of particular interest was the relative
ability of these cognitive characteristics to predict PTSD symptoms to lower magnitude events
(i.e., criterion A unmet). It is possible that the development of PTSD symptoms to lower
magnitude events can be explained by the presence of cognitive risk factors that play a role in the
very etiology of PTSD.
Event characteristics that were evaluated for their predictive capacity included event type,
degree of perceived life threat, extent of physical injury, event duration (e.g., acute versus
chronic), relationship to offender for interpersonal events, and received social support associated
with the event. Personal characteristics that were assessed and analyzed as predictors of PTSD
symptoms were sex, age, socioeconomic status, and trauma history. Finally, cognitive factors
that were incorporated into the predictive formula included worry, experiential avoidance,
benefit-finding, core beliefs, hardiness, and, self-efficacy.

2

Unless otherwise stated, satisfaction of criterion A means that both criterion A1 and criterion A2 are met.
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Additionally, in response to criticisms of the DSM-IV’s conceptualization of PTSD (e.g.,
Asmundson et al., 2000; Weathers & Keane, 2007), both criterion A1 and A2 were assessed, and
feelings of shock, anger, and shame were assessed in addition to the feelings of fear,
helplessness, or horror stipulated in the diagnostic criteria. The factor structure of PTSD was also
examined for PTSD symptoms related to criterion A events and non-criterion A events.
Hypotheses
The present investigation had several aims. First, it was designed to assess the relative
contribution of event and person characteristics to PTSD symptom development in a sample of
persons exposed to a variety of types of trauma. Second, it was designed to assess the predictors
of PTSD symptoms in response to events that do not satisfy criterion A (in its entirety) in the
DSM-IV’s diagnostic system. Third, this study reexamined the nature of PTSD as described in
the DSM-IV by assessing the impact of expanding criterion A2 to include other emotional
reactions and by reexamining the factor structure of PTSD symptoms. See Figure 2 for a diagram
that includes the instruments that were used to assess each component of the cognitive model.
Based on existing literature, the following hypotheses were made:
1. Event and person characteristics would predict PTSD symptoms in response to events
that satisfy criterion A. Event characteristics associated with greater PTSD
symptomology would include event type (interpersonal greater than noninterpersonal), higher degree of perceived threat, longer event duration, lower
perceived support related to the event, and closer relationship with the assailant for
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Cognitive Models of PTSD

Theory: Avoidance keeps
memories from
consolidating (e.g., Ehlers
& Clark, 2000; Foa et al.,
1989).

Worry and
rumination

PSWQ
WBSI

Experiential
avoidance

AAQ

Theory: Information is not
consistent with pre-existing
cognitive schemas and is not
incorporated adequately (e.g.,
Janoff-Bulman,1989; Wells,
2000).

BenefitFinding

PTGI

Core
Beliefs

PTCI

Theory: Helplessness and
perception of no control
lead to inadequate coping
(e.g., Mikulincer &
Solomon, 1988;
Seligman, 1975).

Hardiness

DRI

Selfefficacy

SES,
CSE,
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Figure 2. Cognitive Variables and Measures Related to Cognitive Models of PTSD
interpersonal events. Person characteristics that predict PTSD symptoms would
include female sex, lower socioeconomic status in family of origin, and a history of
exposure to multiple traumatic events. Cognitive characteristics that predict greater
PTSD symptom severity would be worry, experiential avoidance, and negative core
beliefs, whereas benefit-finding, hardiness and self-efficacy would be associated with
lower PTSD symptom severity. The literature is mixed on the relationships between
PTSD and degree of injury and age, so analyses of these variables was exploratory.
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2. Person characteristics and cognitive characteristics would also predict PTSD
symptoms in response to events that do not satisfy criterion A. Cognitive
characteristics would predict PTSD symptoms above and beyond the influence of
event and person characteristics. Further, person and cognitive characteristics would
be stronger predictors of PTSD than event characteristics would be for events that do
not satisfy criterion A.
3. Cognitive variables would mediate the relationship between trauma exposure and
PTSD symptoms.
4. Retrospective reports of feelings of shock, anger, or shame after participants’ reported
worst events would predict PTSD symptoms. These feelings are expanded elements
of criterion A2.
5. The viability of two 4-factor measurement models was compared to the current 3factor DSM-IV model. Specifically, it was hypothesized that King et al.’s (1998)
four-factor intercorrelated numbing model and Simms et al.’s (2002) intercorrelated
four-factor dysphoria model would fit the data from both groups better than the DSMIV hierarchical three-factor model.
Method
Participants
Eligible participants were students 18 years of age or older at Eastern Michigan
University. The participants received extra credit in one of their psychology classes in an amount
that was determined by their instructor upon completion of the study questionnaires. The goal
was to recruit at least 340 participants for participation in this study. The sample size for this
study was selected to maximize power. A sample size of at least 245 participants was needed to
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achieve a power of at least .8 using multiple regression, assuming a maximum of 30 predictors, a
significance level of .01, and a moderate effect size of .15 (Cohen, 1988). The sample size of at
least 340 was selected to ensure a large enough sample to also conduct a confirmatory factor
analysis of the PTSD Checklist to test various proposed PTSD factor structures for participants
who do and do not meet criterion A. Comrey and Lee (1992) as well as Tabachnick and Fidell
(2001) advise that factor analysis should be conducted on large sample sizes. According to their
guidelines, 50 cases is very poor, 100 is poor, 200 is fair, 300 is good, 500 is very good, and
1000 or more is excellent. As a rule of thumb, a minimum of 10 observations per variable is
necessary to avoid computational difficulties (Tabachnick & Fidell), so for the 17-item PCL-C,
the sample size should be at least 170. Assuming relatively equal numbers of persons who satisfy
and do not satisfy criterion A, a sample size of 340 was required in order to run two confirmatory
factor analyses.
Measures
The Questionnaire battery was composed of twelve measures. These instruments assessed
characteristics of traumatic and stressful life events to which respondents were exposed,
responses to these life experiences, and a variety of cognitive factors (Appendices A-L). Each of
the measures is briefly described in this section.
Demographic Questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire was developed for the
purposes of this study and contains items assessing participant age, sex, relationship status (e.g.,
married, single, living with partner, etc.), class status (e.g., freshman, sophomore, etc.), racial
background, approximate income and perceived economic situation (e.g., barely enough to get
by to plenty of luxuries) of childhood family, living situation (e.g., with family, alone, etc.),
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employment status, and therapy history (i.e., number of sessions). See Appendix A for a copy of
the Demographic Questionnaire.
Traumatic Events Questionnaire (TEQ)-Revised. The TEQ (Vrana & Lauterbach,
1994) assesses exposure to traumatic events that have the potential to elicit symptoms of
posttraumatic stress. The items address the following types of trauma: (1) serious industrial,
farm, or automobile accidents and /or large fires or explosions; (2) sexual assault or rape; (3)
natural disasters; (4) violent crimes; (5) abusive relationships in adulthood; (6) physical or sexual
abuse in childhood; (7) witnessing a serious injury or violent death; (8) being in a dangerous
situation; and (9) receiving news of the unexpected death of a loved one. The instrument also
includes two residual categories that allow respondents to describe any traumatic events they
have experienced that do not fit into one of the listed categories or events that they do not feel
comfortable identifying.
The TEQ assesses the type, number, and impact of each experienced trauma.
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they have experienced the event described in the
particular item, and they move on to the next item if they report that they did not experience the
event. For each event that they report experiencing, respondents recorded the number of times it
happened and how old they were at the time of the event. Respondents also rated the severity of
the event along the following four dimensions: (a) severity of injuries, (b) degree to which they
felt that their lives were endangered, (c) how traumatic the event was for them at the time, and
(d) how traumatic the event is for them currently. The items assessing severity were summed to
form an index of trauma intensity. Each of the severity ratings were made on a seven-point
Likert-type scale anchored by 1 = not at all and 7 = severely/extremely. Persons endorsing more
than one event were asked to indicate which was the most traumatic. Participants who reported
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experiencing no traumatic events were asked to briefly describe the worst event to happen to
them.
The temporal stability of the TEQ appears to be high over a two-week test-retest interval
(Lauterbach & Vrana, 1993). The TEQ reliably assessed the number of events (r = .91) and the
occurrence of specific events experienced by the respondents (range of r = .72 for dangerous
situations to r = 1.0 for child abuse).
This study used a modified version of the TEQ to better address the hypotheses of this
study. To shorten the scale and simplify scoring, items 8 (i.e., being in a dangerous situation) and
the two residual categories were replaced by a single item that asks about any other trauma and
provides a list of events that could be endorsed. These events include near drowning, suicide
attempt, serious illness, miscarriage, abortion, kidnapping, combat experience, being attacked by
an animal, and being a refugee. The events were grouped together in a single item, because they
were expected to be endorsed less frequently in a university student sample than other events on
the TEQ. These additional events added to the TEQ were taken from the National Comorbidity
Survey-Replication trauma history questionnaire (Kessler et al., 2004). For traumas of an
interpersonal nature (i.e., assault, physical or sexual abuse, rape), this revised version of the TEQ
asks participants to indicate the nature of their relationship to the perpetrator (e.g., parent,
sibling, other relative, friend, acquaintance, stranger) and rate their degree of closeness to the
perpetrator on a seven-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 = not at all close and 7 = extremely
close. At the end of the questionnaire, participants were instructed to write in their most
traumatic experience if it was not listed earlier in the questionnaire. A list of events was provided
to assist participants in identifying their worst experience. Events on the list include parents’
divorce, serious financial problems, breaking a limb, experiencing verbal abuse, moving to a new
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place to live, breaking up with somebody, a relative or other person dying even though it was
expected (e.g., from cancer, or a heart attack or stroke at a late age), failing a class, getting
arrested, getting pulled over by a police officer when driving, getting in a physical altercation,
getting lost, having no place to live, getting into a minor traffic accident, infidelity in an intimate
relationship, being diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease, losing one’s job, and entering
into a relationship despite parents’ disapproval. The event list was developed by consulting with
a psychologist at a university counseling center and is based on a presentation examining the
nature of traumas and stressful events reported by university students (Lauterbach, Gloster, &
Hayes, 2002). Participants were then instructed to keep the most traumatic experience in mind as
they answered questions pertaining to their feelings during the event and their perception of
social support associated with the event. To assess criterion A2, an item was added to the TEQ
which asks participants to rate their level of fear, helplessness, horror, anger, shock or numbness,
and shame or guilt at the time of the worst event. To assess support received in response to the
worst event, four items were added to the TEQ asking participants to rate the level of support
they felt surrounding the event at the time of the event and currently. They were asked to indicate
how much support they felt was available at the time, how much support they felt they received
at the time, how helpful the support was at the time, and much support they receive now related
to the event. Items were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 = none and 7 = a
great deal. See Appendix B for a copy of the revised TEQ.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist – Civilian (PCL-C). The PCL-C (Weathers,
Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993) is a 17-item measure of posttraumatic stress disorder
symptoms corresponding to DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. For each symptom, respondents rated
how much the symptom disturbed them during the past month on a five-point Likert-type scale
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that ranged from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely. Scores on the items were summed to yield a total
score that ranges from 17 to 85, with higher scores suggesting more severe symptomology.
The PCL-C contains three subscales that reflect the symptom categories of PTSD
identified in the DSM-IV: reexperiencing, avoidance, and arousal. A diagnosis of PTSD is
suggested if individuals endorse one or more “reexperiencing” symptoms, three or more
“avoidance or numbing” symptoms, and two or more “arousal” symptoms. Weathers et al.
(1993) also suggest that total scores of 50 or more suggest a formal diagnosis of PTSD.
The PCL-C has good psychometric properties (Weathers et al., 1993). Scores are stable
over a three-day test-rest interval (r = .96). The PCL-C also has good internal consistency (alpha
= .97). The convergent validity of the PCL-C with other PTSD measures is good. Weathers et al.
(1993) reported that the PCL-C correlates r = .93 with the Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related
PTSD, r =.90 with the Impact of Events Scale, and r = .77 with the PTSD-Keane scale from the
MMPI-II. In addition, the PCL-C appears to have adequate diagnostic utility as measured against
the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-III-R; sensitivity = .82, specificity = .83, kappa =
.64 (Weathers et al., 1993). See Appendix C for a copy of the PCL-C.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ). The PSWQ (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, &
Borkovec, 1990) consists of 16 self-report items designed to assess the frequency and intensity
of worry. Items were obtained from a factor analysis of 161 items in a sample of college
students, in which items were deleted if they were ambiguous, redundant, or did not load highly
onto a general factor (Meyer et al.). Items were derived from theoretical perspectives on the
nature of worry and the authors’ clinical experience with clients with generalized anxiety
disorder. Items are in the form of statements about the duration and intensity of worry that are
rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale reflecting how well each statement describes the
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respondent’s experiences with worry (1 = not at all typical of me, 5 = very typical of me). Five
items are reverse scored so that scores range from 16 to 80 with higher scores reflecting greater
tendencies to worry.
The PSWQ is psychometrically sound. Coefficient alpha ranges from .91 to .95 in five
samples of undergraduate students from three different universities (Davey, 1993; Meyer et al.,
1990). Test-retest reliability has been found to range from .52 to .93 over 2 to 8 weeks in three
different samples of college students (Meyer et al.). Meyer et al. found that scores on the PSWQ
are strongly related to scores on measures of psychological constructs meaningfully related to
pervasive worry, such as self-esteem (r = -.29), perfectionism (r = .39), time urgency (r = .47),
trait anxiety (r = .64), state anxiety (r = .49), and depression (r = .36). Davey’s (1993)
comparison of three worry questionnaires also demonstrated that the PSWQ correlated
significantly with trait anxiety (r = .74) and other worry scales (r = .59-.67) in a sample of
undergraduates. Finally, high scores on the PSWQ were shown to predict worry frequency and
duration from logs kept by 432 students during the six consecutive days and nights following
administration of the PSWQ (Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayes, 2007). See Appendix D for a copy
of the PSWQ.
White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI). The WBSI (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) is
a 15-item self-report questionnaire that assesses general thought suppression tendencies, or the
deliberate avoidance of unpleasant thoughts. Respondents were instructed to rate on a 5-point
Likert-type scale their level of agreement with statements about intrusiveness of thoughts,
cognitive avoidance, and persistence of unwanted thoughts (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree). Scores could range from 15 to 75, with higher scores reflecting greater thought
suppression tendencies. The WBSI was developed through a series of factor analytic studies in
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samples of undergraduates. An item pool of 72 items was reduced to a group of 15 items that
loaded onto a single factor accounting for 55% of the rating variance (Wegner & Zanakos). The
factor structure of the WBSI has been debated, however, with some researchers finding two
factors (e.g., Hoping & de Jong-Meyer, 2003; Rassin, 2003) or three factors (e.g., Blumberg,
2000). Luciano, Belloch, Algarabel, Tomas, Morillo, and Lucero (2006) used a Spanish
translation of the WBSI in a sample of 540 undergraduates in Spain to test 6 alternative models
and found that none provided a good fit for the data, leading the authors to suggest that the factor
structure is unclear.
The WBSI has demonstrated good reliability and validity in several studies. Coefficient
alpha has been calculated at .88 (Hoping & de Jong-Meyer, 2003) and .89 (Palm & Strong, 2007;
Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Test-retest reliability was r = .92 over a 1-week period (Wegner &
Zanakos), r = .78 over an interval of 3 to 6 weeks (Hoping & de Jong-Meyer), and r = .69 at in a
study with inter-test intervals ranging from 3 weeks to 3 months (Wegner & Zanakos). Several
studies have found significant correlations between WBSI scores and measures of depression,
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, pathological worry, and anxiety (Hoping & de Jong-Meyer;
Luciano et al., 2006; Palm & Strong; Wegner & Zanakos). See Appendix E for a copy of the
WBSI.
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ). The AAQ (Hayes et al., 2004) is a 9item self-report measure of experiential avoidance, or the avoidance of particular private
experiences (e.g., emotions, memories, images, bodily sensations). Respondents rated on a 7point Likert-type scale the degree to which each statement applies to them (1 = never true, 7 =
always true). Higher scores represent greater use of experiential avoidance, with four items
reverse-scored. Hayes et al. conducted a series of studies with a total of over 2,400
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undergraduates in the development and validation of the measure. Factor analytic studies
demonstrate that items load on a single factor, with avoidance items loading positively at one end
and acceptance and action items loading negatively on the other (Hayes et al.; Zvolensky &
Forsyth, 2002).
Reliability and validity estimates for the AAQ are adequate. Internal consistency as
calculated by Cronbach’s alpha is .70 (Hayes et al., 2004), and the AAQ demonstrates concurrent
validity in its significant positive correlations with scores on measures of anxiety and depression
(Hayes et al., 1994; 1996). The AAQ accounts for variance in general psychopathology,
depression, and anxiety above and beyond variance accounted for by measures of avoidant
coping and self-deceptive positivity (Hayes et al., 2004). See Appendix F for a copy of the AAQ.
Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI). The PTGI (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) is a
21-item self-report inventory that assesses respondents’ perceptions of positive outcomes
following traumatic experiences. Respondents rated the degree to which each listed change
occurred as a result of their traumatic experience. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale
ranging from 0 = I did not experience this change to 5 = I experienced this change to a very
great degree). All items are scored in the same direction so that higher scores represent greater
perception of posttraumatic growth.
Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) reduced their item pool from 34 items to the current 21
items following results of a principal components analysis in 604 undergraduates that yielded 5
interpretable factors: relating to others (6 items), new possibilities (5 items), personal strength (4
items), spiritual change (2 items), and appreciation of life (3 items). The 5-factor structure was
confirmed in a separate sample of 926 adults in a community sample (Taku, Cann, Calhoun, &
Tedeschi, 2008).

Predictors of PTSD Symptoms 51

The PTGI appears to be a reliable instrument. The original study by Tedeschi and
Calhoun (1996) yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .90 for the entire scale and alphas from .67 to .85
for the five individual scales. Sheikh and Marotta (2005) reported similar internal consistency
reliability coefficients in a sample of 124 individuals who had recently experienced a myocardial
infarction and/or coronary artery bypass surgery (α = .96 for the total score and .88-.91 for the
five scales). Tedeschi and Calhoun reported corrected item-total correlations that ranged from
.35 to .63, correlations among factors that ranged from .27 to .52, and correlations of the factors
with the total score that ranged from .62 to .83. Sheikh and Marotta reported similar values in
their sample of cardiovascular disease patients, with scales correlating moderately to strongly
with each other (rs = .40-.82) and strongly with the PTGI total score (rs above .8 for all scales).
Sheikh and Marotta also found the PTGI’s split-half reliability to be quite good, with a
Spearman-Brown coefficient of .92 (α = .94 and .91 for the first and second half of the PTGI,
respectively). Test-retest reliability in a sample of 28 undergraduates was acceptable (r = .71)
over a 2-month interval (Tedeschi & Calhoun).
There is also evidence to support the convergent and discriminant validity of the PTGI.
Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) reported that it correlates positively with optimism, religiosity, and
personality factors of openness, agreeableness, and extraversion and does not correlate
significantly with a measure of social desirability. Tedeschi and Calhoun presented evidence of
construct validity as well. There was a significantly greater degree of benefits perceived by
persons who experienced traumatic events than by persons who experienced less severe events.
This result led the authors to suggest that perception of benefits is not illusory, because, if PTGI
scores were simply a function of positivity bias, then there should be no relationship between
severity of trauma and degree of benefits reported. See Appendix G for a copy of the PTGI.
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Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI). The PTCI (Foa et al., 1999) is a 36-item
self-report questionnaire that assesses trauma-related thoughts and beliefs. Items are rated on a 7point Likert-type scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). Scores could range from 36 to
252, with higher scores representing more negative posttraumatic cognitions.
The PTCI was originally developed as an adaptation of another commonly used measure,
the World Assumptions Scale (WAS; Janoff-Bulman, 1989). The PTCI was developed to assess
cognitions associated with PTSD rather than cognitions associated with trauma exposure in
general. Both the PTCI and the WAS assess cognitions related to the world, other people, and
self. Although the WAS is a well established measure, the PTCI was selected for use in the
current study because scoring of the PTCI is more explicit, the psychometrics are stronger (Foa
et al., 1999), and the PTCI has been found to predict PTSD severity better than the WAS. Also,
the majority of recent studies utilize the PTCI instead of the WAS (e.g., Moser et al., 2007;
O’Donnell et al., 2007).
A principal-components analysis in a sample of 601 adults (110 patients with PTSD, 190
community volunteers, and 300 undergraduates; Foa et al., 1999) yielded a 3-factor structure of
negative cognitions about self (21 items), negative cognitions about the world (7 items), and selfblame (5 items). Three of the items on the scale are included in the total score but are not
included in the subscales, based on Foa et al.’s note that these items are experimental and were
added after the factor structure had been determined. Foa et al. reported high internal consistency
coefficients for the scales: Cronbach’s α = .97 for negative cognitions about self, .88 for negative
cognitions about the world, .86 for self-blame, and .97 for the total score. Subscale test-retest
reliabilities ranged from .75 to .89 over a one-week interval and from .80 to .86 over a threeweek interval (Foa et al.).
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Foa et al. (1999) reported that convergent validity was supported by the scale’s
significant correlations with other measures of trauma-related cognitions (rs = .20 to .74 for the
various subscales), PTSD severity (r = .79), depression (r = .75), and general anxiety (rs = .70 to
.75). Foa et al. reported that the scale discriminated among persons with PTSD, persons who
experienced trauma without PTSD, and nontraumatized persons and that these differences were
not attributable to differences in depression or anxiety. Finally, a discriminant function analysis
revealed that the PTCI classified 86% of 355 traumatized individuals correctly into those with
and without PTSD. See Appendix H for a copy of the PTCI.
Dispositional Resilience Index (DRI). The DRI (Bartone et al., 1989) is a 30-item shortform self-report questionnaire that represents a modified version of Kobasa’s (1979) measure of
personality hardiness. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale according to how much
respondents agree with statements about perspectives on work, approaches to problem-solving,
and sense of control over life circumstances (0 = not true at all, 3 = completely true). Half of the
items are reverse-scored so that higher scores represent greater hardiness. Bartone’s version of
the hardiness scale corrects problems found in Kobasa’s hardiness scale, such as long and
awkward sentences and unidirectional scoring of items, which may lend itself to response bias
(Funk & Houston, 1987).
Consistent with Kobasa’s (1979) conceptualization of hardiness, the DRI has three 10item subscales of commitment (i.e., perception of stress as meaningful), control (i.e., perception
of stressors as changeable), and challenge (i.e., perception of changes as challenges rather than
threats). The division of the measure into scales was supported in principal component factor
analyses in samples of 787 bus drivers and 111 army officers and showed adequate reliability,
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with Cronbach’s alphas of .82 for the whole short-version scale and .62 to .82 for the three
subscales (Bartone et al., 1989).
Although there are currently no studies assessing the validity of the DRI, numerous
studies have confirmed the validity of Kobasa’s (1979) measure of hardiness on which Bartone’s
(1989) measure was based. For example, hardiness was negatively associated with depression,
shyness, social anxiety, public self-consciousness, and personal distress and positively associated
with optimism, self-esteem, and sociability in several samples of undergraduates (Hull, Van
Treuren, & Virnelli, 1987). Discriminant validity was evidenced in the lack of significant
correlation with measures of constructs theorized to be distinct from hardiness, such as sense of
humor, achievement test scores, empathy, perspective taking, and Type A personality
characteristics (Hull et al., 1987). See Appendix I for a copy of the DRI.
Self-efficacy Scale (SES). The SES (Sherer, Maddux, Mercandante, Prentice-Dunn,
Jacobs, & Rogers, 1982) is a 23-item self-report scale that assesses general expectations of
success. Participants rated items on a 14-point Likert scale according to how much they agree
with each statement (1 = strongly disagree, 14 = strongly agree). Fourteen items are reversescored to prevent response bias, and higher scores reflect greater perceived self-efficacy. It
differs from the Coping Self-efficacy scale in its focus on general success expectancies in social
skills and vocational competence rather than expectancies about one’s ability to cope with
challenges and threats. An exploratory factor analysis during the scale’s construction revealed
two factors representing general self-efficacy and social self-efficacy, and this factor structure
was supported in a confirmatory factor analysis in a second sample of undergraduate students
(Sherer et al.).
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The psychometric properties of the SES appear to be sound. Both subscales have
adequate internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s α = .86 for the general self-efficacy
subscale and .71 for the social self-efficacy subscale; Sherer et al., 1982). Sherer et al. assessed
the construct validity of the SES and reported that SES scores correlated significantly with
measures of locus of control (r = -.29, representing an internal locus), social desirability (r =
.43), ego strength (r = .29), interpersonal competence (r = .45), and self-esteem (r = -.51, with
low scores on the self-esteem scale representing higher self-esteem). They also reported that the
scale predicted successful outcomes in a sample of 150 inpatients veterans who were undergoing
treatment for alcoholism. Scores on the SES were significantly positively correlated vocational
success (established through employment status, number of jobs quit, and number of times fired),
highest educational level completed, and highest military ranking earned. Further evidence of the
construct validity of the SES was reported in Sherer and Adam’s (1983) study of 101
undergraduates. They found that high scorers on the general self-efficacy subscale exhibited
better adjustment as evidenced by higher scores on a measure of assertiveness and lower scores
on measures of depression, anxiety, and introversion. See Appendix J for a copy of the SES.
Coping Self-efficacy Scale (CSE). The CSE (Chesney et al., 2006) is a 26-item selfreport measure of perceived self-efficacy in coping with challenges and threats. Respondents
were asked to rate their confidence in engaging in 26 coping behaviors. Confidence in engaging
in each behavior was assessed on an 11-point Likert-type scale (0 = cannot do at all, 10 =
certainly can do). Items were derived from stress and coping theory, a coping questionnaire, and
consultation with Dr. Albert Bandura of Stanford University (Chesney et al.). Items were piloted
and selected for face validity in a sample of HIV-infected patients, and then an exploratory factor
analysis was conducted in a different sample of HIV-infected participants that yielded three
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factors: problem-focused coping (12 items), emotion-focused coping (9 items), and social
support (5 items; Chesney et al.).
The CSE appears to have sufficient reliability and validity as a measure of perceived
coping efficacy, but, as a relatively new measure, limited psychometric data are available.
Chesney et al. (2006) reported that internal consistency estimates (Cronbach’s alpha) ranged
from .8 for the social support scale to .91 for the other two scales (problem- and emotion-focused
coping). In this study, test-retest correlations ranged from .4 to .8 over a 12-month period, with
lowest test-retest correlations obtained between baseline and 12-months. They also reported
concurrent validity in the form of significant correlations in the predicted directions between the
CSE and measures of psychological distress and well-being, coping styles, and social support.
Finally, Chesney et al. reported that changes in coping self-efficacy, especially in regard to the
use of problem- and emotion-focused behaviors, predicted changes in psychological distress and
well-being over a 12-month period in HIV-infected men in therapy for depressed mood. See
Appendix K for a copy of the CSE.
Anxiety Control Questionnaire (ACQ). The ACQ (Rapee, Craske, Brown, & Barlow,
1996) is a 30-item self-report instrument that assesses perceived control over anxiety-provoking
events. Items are ranked on a six-point Likert-type scale (0 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree) according to the degree participants agree with each statement (e.g., “I can usually stop
my anxiety from showing”). Eighteen items are reverse-scored so that higher scores represent
greater perceived control. Although factor analyses in two samples (anxiety disorder patients and
undergraduates) indicated that the ACQ is composed of two factors (i.e., control over external
events and control over internal emotional reactions; Rapee et al.), ACQ total scores are typically
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used as a global index of perceived control over threatening events (e.g., Feldner & Hekmat,
2001; Rapee et al.).
Rapee et al. (1996) reported that the Cronbach’s alpha for the overall scale was .87 in a
sample of 250 persons receiving outpatient treatment for a DSM-III-R anxiety disorder, with an
alpha of .83 for the external events subscale and .80 for the internal emotional reactions subscale.
Similar results were found in a sample of 236 undergraduates (total scale α = .89, events α = .82,
reactions α = .84; Rapee et al.). Test-retest correlations in undergraduates students were .88 over
a 1-week interval and .82 over one month (Rapee et al.).
Rapee et al. (1996) also report that the ACQ demonstrates good convergent and
discriminant validity. The ACQ showed significant, moderate, negative correlations with
measures of anxiety and significant, moderate correlations with other measures of control.
However, the ACQ correlated more strongly with measures of anxiety than did more global
measures of control. Anxiety disorder patients scored significantly lower on the ACQ than did
undergraduates, whereas a sample of men diagnosed with erectile disorder scored higher than
anxiety disorder patients, which suggests that the ACQ is not simply assessing aspects of general
distress. Finally, there is evidence that the ACQ is sensitive to changes during therapy, as the
mean score for 19 persons who received cognitive behavioral therapy for panic disorder with
agoraphobia increased from 63.7 to 93.3 after the 12-week treatment (Rapee et al.). See
Appendix L for a copy of the ACQ.
Procedure
Recruitment took place during regularly scheduled class times. During recruitment, a
brief summary of the research project was presented, which included the purpose of the study,
the amount of extra credit to be earned, the anticipated time commitment for participation (45-60
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minutes), and the time and location of the study. The students were told that all responses were
confidential and that they could discontinue participation at any time without penalty. Refer to
Appendix M for the Informed Consent Form and Appendix N for the Informed Consent Script
that details the information that was presented.
Data collection involved group administration of the questionnaire packet. At the
beginning of each session, the principal investigator or a research assistant explained the nature
of the participation. Students were again told that they were being asked to participate in one
session during which they would complete a questionnaire packet assessing stressful or traumatic
life events, their responses to those events, and their beliefs about themselves and others. The
participants were reminded that all responses are confidential and that they were free to
discontinue at any time without penalty. They were asked to provide contact information if they
would like to receive a summary of the findings when the study is complete.
After the general nature of the session was explained, the principal investigator or
research assistant verbally summarized the informed consent form. Participants were asked to
review and endorse the consent form and, upon agreement to participate, were given a copy of
the consent form to retain for their own records. The form included the name of the primary
investigator, the name and contact information of the dissertation advisor, and information about
resources (i.e., counseling services) available to them if they would like to discuss their response
to their research participation. The participants completed a brief demographics questionnaire, a
life events questionnaire (TEQ: Vrana & Lauterbach, 1994), and a measure to assess the impact
of traumatic life events (PCL-C: Weathers et al., 1993). They also completed a series of brief
scales that assessed cognitive factors hypothesized to be risk or resilience factors following
trauma exposure. These measures assessed worry (PSWQ: Meyer et al., 1990), the use of thought
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suppression (WBSI: Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), experiential avoidance (AAQ: Hayes et al.,
2004), coping self-efficacy (CSE: Chesney et al., 2006), general self-efficacy (SES: Sherer et al.,
1982), hardiness (DRI: Bartone et al., 1989), posttraumatic growth (PTGI: Tedeschi & Calhoun,
1996), posttraumatic cognitions (PTCI: Foa et al., 1999), and perceived control over anxiety
(ACQ: Rapee et al., 1996). Instructions for completing all instruments were presented verbally to
participants prior to completion, and participants were encouraged to ask for clarification of any
instructions or items.
The first five instruments were presented in a fixed order to all participants. All
participants completed the TEQ prior to receiving the rest of the questionnaires. This was done to
ensure that the instructions were given close in time to completion of the TEQ and so that
researcher assistants could individually verify that participants endorsed a worst event before
they were given the rest of the questionnaires. All questionnaire packets began with (1) the
demographics questionnaire, (2) the TEQ (3) the PCL-C, (4) the PTCI, and (5) the PTGI. The
PCL-C, the PTCI, and the PTGI were intended to be completed while participants are thinking
about the event they listed on the TEQ, so it was necessary for the TEQ to precede these
instruments. These questionnaires were administered first to reduce the possibility of missing
data on the TEQ and PCL-C, the two most important measures in the study in terms of providing
variables for subsequent analyses. Additionally, items on the demographics questionnaire, in
concert with other measures, were used to impute missing values in the event that patterns of
missing data were observed. Participants were instructed to begin answering “in general” and not
in specific reference to their selected event once they start the sixth questionnaire.
The final seven questionnaires were administered in two randomly-generated sequences:
(1) DRI, SES, ACQ, CSES, WBSI, AAQ, and PSWQ; and (2) PSWQ, DRI, SES, ACQ, AAQ,
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CSES, and WBSI. The sequence was not expected to affect the outcome of the data, but varying
the sequence would minimize the possibility of a systematic bias in the data due to fatigue. The
sequence was coded and examined for possible order effects. It was anticipated that there would
be no order effects and that all analyses would collapse across the two groups. Independent
samples t-tests were used to compare the two order conditions on each of the seven measures. A
significance level of .01 was selected to reduce Type 1 error. Groups differed on only the SES
[t(421)=-2.8, p<.01]. Persons who completed the second sequence had significantly higher scores
on the SES (M=229.3, SD=40.8) than did persons who completed the first sequence (M=217.6,
SD=45.2). When regression analyses were run separately for each sequence, SES scores emerged
as a significant predictor of PTSD severity among persons who completed Sequence 1 and not
among persons who completed Sequence 2. The implications of this finding will be reviewed in
the discussion section of this paper.
To minimize missing data, when participants turned in their completed packets,
questionnaires were checked for omissions or unclear answers. Clarification of answers, if
necessary, was established before the participant left. Participants were encouraged to review the
TEQ carefully, and instructions were read aloud to participants prior to completion. When
participants completed the TEQ, they were asked to bring their completed questionnaire to a
research assistant. The research assistant verified that participants correctly completed the TEQ
and distributed the remainder of the packet. This verification was important because several
questionnaires required that participants correctly complete the TEQ and clearly identify a single
worst event.
Because data collection occurred over the course of two semesters, it was important to
ensure that participants did not submit data more than once. Consequently, each participant was
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asked to write a code on his or her questionnaires. This code was their two-digit day of birth
(e.g., 08), the last two digits of their home street address, followed by the last two digits of their
phone number. Questionnaire packets were then examined to ensure that there were no duplicate
codes. If a duplicate code occurred, the answer sheet corresponding to the later test period would
have been discarded; however, there were no duplicates. Several participants began testing
sessions but then left before completing any measures after stating that they had already
completed the study.
Independent Variables
Independent variables fell roughly into three categories: event characteristics, person
variables, and cognitive factors. Event characteristics were obtained from the TEQ, person
variables from the demographics questionnaire and TEQ, and cognitive factors from a number of
individual instruments.
Event characteristics obtained from the TEQ that were analyzed as predictors of PTSD
symptom severity included type of event (interpersonal or not interpersonal), degree of perceived
threat, event duration, degree of injury, perception of support related to the event, and, for
interpersonal events, relationship to offender. Event type was coded 0 for reported worst events
that are not of an interpersonal nature (i.e., do not have a clearly identified “perpetrator”) and 1
for interpersonal events. Perceived threat was taken from the TEQ item addressing life threat for
worst event. Scores could range from 1 not at all to 7, to extremely. Event duration was coded 1
for a single occurrence of a person’s worst event, 2 for multiple discrete occurrences of a
person’s worst event, 3 for ongoing events that lasted less than one year, and 4 for ongoing worst
events that were reported to have lasted for a year or longer. Degree of injury was ascertained
from the TEQ item addressing extent of injury (rated 1 to 7) for the identified worst events.
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Received support was obtained from the TEQ ratings for support at the time of the event and for
current support (rated 1 to 7). For events with a clear perpetrator (i.e., interpersonal events),
closeness to offender was obtained from the TEQ rating for emotional closeness to offender prior
to the event (rated 1 to 7). Categories of relationships were also assessed for each TEQ item that
involves a perpetrator, so follow-up analyses were conducted to determine which relationships
are most strongly associated with PTSD symptoms.
Person variables that were obtained from the demographics questionnaire included sex,
age, and socioeconomic status of family-of-origin. Sex was coded 0 for males and 1 for females.
Age was entered as reported. Socioeconomic status was entered as two separate variables: annual
income and relative wealth as perceived by the respondent. Income was entered as a score
ranging from 1 (less than $10,000) to 7 (greater than $150,000) depending on which categories
were endorsed. Perception of wealth was obtained from the item instructing participants to
endorse the statement that best describes their family’s economic status rated from 1 (we had
barely enough to get by) to 5 (we had plenty of luxuries). The final person variable that was
included as a predictor in analyses was trauma history. This was obtained by summing the
number of discrete traumas identified on the TEQ.
Cognitive factors that were entered as independent variables in analyses were derived
from summed scores on the measures that assessed each variable. Variables included worry
(PSWQ total), thought suppression (WBSI total), experiential avoidance (AAQ total), coping
self-efficacy (CSE total), self-efficacy (SES total), hardiness (DRI total), perception of benefit
(PTGI total), posttraumatic cognitions (PTCI total), and perceived control over anxietyprovoking events (ACQ total).
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Subscale scores for self-efficacy, hardiness, perception of benefit, and posttraumatic
cognitions were also calculated. The self-efficacy subscales was created as suggested by Sherer
et al. (1982) by obtaining the mean on the SES for the general self-efficacy subscale (items 1-17)
and the social self-efficacy subscale (items 18-23). The three hardiness scales on the DRI were
obtained by using the total scores on each of the three components: commitment (items 1, 6-7,
11, 16-17, 22, 27-28, 30), control (items 2-3, 8-9, 12, 15, 18, 20, 25, 29), and challenge (items 45, 10, 13-14, 19, 21, 23-24, 26). Because each subscale has the same number of items, Bartone et
al. (1989) suggest using totals instead of means. The PTGI’s five scales of perceived benefit was
obtained by calculating the mean for the set of items in each subscale: relating to others (items 6,
8-9, 15-16, 20-21), new possibilities (items 3, 7, 11, 14, 17), personal strength (items 4, 10, 12,
19), spiritual change (items 5, 18), and appreciation of life (items 1-2, 13). The PTCI’s three
scales of posttraumatic cognitions were used to calculate a mean for each set of items: negative
cognitions about self (items 2-6, 9, 12, 14, 16-17, 20-21, 24-26, 28-30, 33, 35-36), negative
cognitions about the world (items 7-8, 10-11, 18, 23, 27), and self-blame (items 1, 15, 19, 22,
31).
Retrospective reports of peritraumatic feelings of fear, helplessness, horror, anger, shock,
and shame also constituted predictors in several analyses. Scores were obtained from items
added to the TEQ items that instructed participants to rate these emotions on a 7-point Likerttype scale.
Participants’ data were coded for fulfillment of criterion A. Events were considered to
qualify for criterion A1 if they were listed in Breslau and Kessler’s (2001) list of 19 qualifying
events (Appendix O) and for A2 if values of 5, 6, or 7 on the Likert-type scale of any of the TEQ
items assessing responses of fear, helplessness, or horror were endorsed. Events that did not
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clearly meet criterion A1 (i.e., events not listed in Breslau and Kessler’s list of events) were
evaluated by two independent judges for the degree the event coincided with the DSM-IV’s
description of criterion A1. In the case of disagreement, a third person would have been
consulted, and the judges would have discussed the matter until an agreement was reached.
There was no disagreement on any item, however. Events that did not meet both components of
criterion A were coded as non-qualifying events for subsequent analyses.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable was PTSD scores on the PCL-C. Ratings for each item were
summed to provide an overall index of posttraumatic stress symptom severity.
Data Analyses
Prior to performing the correlation and regression analyses, the data were screened for
adherence to the statistical assumptions required by multiple regression and factor analysis. The
data were screened for missing values, outliers, normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity, and
tested for multicollinearity for multiple regression analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), and
PCL-C scores were screened for missing values, outliers, normality, and linearity according to
the assumptions required by factor analysis (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005).
After ensuring that data were entered correctly by inspecting the descriptive statistics for
each variable, the data were screened for missing values. Five participants neglected to turn in
the Demographics Questionnaire, and 29 participants failed to answer the three items on the back
of the Demographics Questionnaire. One person did not complete the AAQ or PSWQ due to
time constraints. Finally, a few items were left blank on some of the other measures (i.e., three
missing values on each of three items on the PTCI, three missing values on one item of the DRI
and two missing values on a second item, one missing value on each of two items on the SES
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and CSES and on each of three items on the ACQ, two missing values on one item on the AAQ,
and one missing value on the PSWQ). There were no missing values on the TEQ, PCL-C, PTGI,
and WBSI. Patterns of missing data were identified using the SPSS missing value analysis
module.
Three patterns of missingness were possible, two of which can be addressed through
statistical techniques (West, 2001). Values missing completely at random (MCAR) are values
that are not correlated with other variables. For example, if a copying error results in the deletion
of several items on a portion of the questionnaire packets, these data would be missing
completely at random. In this example, missingness is not related to any subject characteristics.
For values missing at random (MAR), missingness is not related to the variable being assessed
but is related to other measured variables. For example, if depressed persons are more likely than
nondepressed persons to omit information about their income, the missing data do relate to
another variable (depression). If an analysis is conducted only with depressed participants,
however, and the resulting analysis reveals that the probability of reporting income is unrelated
to level of income, the data can be treated as if it is missing at random. Finally, for data that are
missing not at random (MNAR), missingness is related to the dependent variable. If persons with
low income consistently omit the item assessing income, then missingness would be classified as
MNAR. Values that are missing completely at random or missing at random can be imputed
using statistical techniques.
The SPSS missing value analysis module was used to identify patterns of missingness,
which were categorized by the analyses as missing completely at random or missing at random
(see Table 2). Pairwise deletion, casewise deletion, and mean substitution have been criticized
for distorting correlations by minimizing variance, so alternative methods of addressing missing
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Table 2
Treatment of Missing Data
Variable

# of Subjects Description

Mechanism Level

Sex

2

MCAR

Nominal

Age

5

MCAR

Ratio

Income

5

MCAR

Interval

Economic
situation

38

MCAR
(5)/MAR
(33)

Interval

PTCI items 20-22

3

Demographics Questionnaire not
collected by assistant, sex could
not be determined by other
answers
Demographics Questionnaire not
collected by assistant
Demographics Questionnaire not
collected by assistant
Demographics Questionnaire not
collected by assistant (5),
Participant did not turn paper
over to answer questions (33)
Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

DRI item 5

3

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

DRI item 21

2

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

SES items 14, 21

1

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

ACQ items 4, 12,
27
CSES item 1

1

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

1

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

AAQ items 1-5,
7-9
AAQ item 6

1

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

3

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

PSWQ items 1-15 1

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

PSWQ item 16

Participant skipped items

MAR

Interval

2

data, such as maximum likelihood, Bayesian multiple imputation, and regression techniques are
recommended (e.g., Schafer & Graham, 2002; Sinharay, Stern, & Russell, 2001). Regression
estimates of missing values were obtained using the SPSS missing value analysis module. SPSS
was used to compute multiple linear regression estimates that were augmented with random
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components, or a residual from a randomly selected case. This procedure was used to impute
missing values. Sex could not be imputed with this method for the two persons missing values on
this variable, so these two participants were dropped from the regression analyses with sex
entered as a predictor.
The only exception to this imputation of missing values applied to the TEQ item
addressing a person’s worst event. If a person did not indicate a worst event, their responses on
the PCL-C, the PTGI, and the PTCI could not be interpreted, because these instruments require
individuals to consider their worst event in their responses to these measures. If participants did
not indicate a worst event on the modified TEQ, they were dropped from all analyses. Data from
three participants were dropped from the study for this reason, resulting in a final sample size of
423.
After the data were screened for missing values, scores on each independent variable
were graphed on a scatterplot individually and in combination with the dependent variable to
check for univariate outliers, normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Calculating
Mahalanobis distances and testing outliers for Mahalanobis chi-square significance were used to
identify multivariate outliers. Only one case was identified as an extreme 3 multivariate outlier,
and most measures contained one or two univariate outliers. Analyses were run both with and
without the univariate outliers and the case that was identified as a multivariate outlier. There
were no discrepancies in the results of these analyses; therefore, results are reported for the
original data with outliers retained. Preliminary screening showed moderate departures from
normality, linearity, and/or homoscedasticity for the majority of measures, so scores were
transformed by taking the square roots of each score, as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell

3

Mertler and Vannatta (2000) define “extreme” outliers as Mahalanobis chi-square values exceeding the critical
value at p < .001.
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(2001). All analyses were run on the original scores and the transformed scores. Because there
were no discrepancies in results, all analyses reported in this paper use the original scores for
ease of interpretation.
The data were also tested for multicollinearity by calculating the tolerance (1 – squared
multiple correlation) of each combination of independent variables. In the event of
multicollinearity, separate regression analyses would have been performed for the independent
variables that were too highly correlated. SPSS automatically assessed for collinearity when the
regression analysis was performed and would have dropped variables that correlated too highly
with other independent variables. No problems with multicollinearity were identified.
The first two hypotheses relating to predictors of PTSD symptom severity for criterion A
events (i.e., the first hypothesis) and events that do not meet criterion A (i.e., the second
hypothesis) were addressed using hierarchical multiple regression. Because there is much
variability in the development of PTSD symptoms following trauma exposure, person variables
were expected to contribute to PTSD symptom severity above and beyond variability that could
be accounted for by event characteristics. To that effect, event characteristics were entered first,
followed by person variables and then cognitive factors. Two separate but identical regression
analyses were conducted for traumas that met criterion A and for those with stressful experiences
that did not meet criterion A. Variables that were entered into block 1 included event type
dummy coded (i.e., interpersonal or not interpersonal), degree of perceived threat, event
duration, degree of injury, support at the time of the event, and current support. Block 2
consisted of sex, the two items from the demographics questionnaire assessing socioeconomic
status, number of previous traumas, and age. Block 3 consisted of scores on cognitive factors
related to avoidance (i.e., scores on the PSWQ, WBSI, and AAQ), inconsistent beliefs (i.e.,
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scores on the PTGI and PTCI), and helplessness (i.e., scores on the DRI, SES, CSE, and ACQ).
This order of entry represents a rigorous test of the hypothesis that cognitive variables are
significant predictors of PTSD symptoms. Consequently, block order was varied to determine the
effect of changing the order.
Subscales of measures that were significant predictors of PTSD symptom severity were
additionally examined for their contribution to PTSD symptom severity. Hierarchical multiple
regression analyses were rerun in the manner outlined above, but total scores were replaced with
mean or total subscale scores (i.e., mean scores for measures with subscales of varying length
and total subscale scores for measures with subscales of identical length) for the instruments that
were significant predictors of PCL-C scores. Of interest in these analyses were the beta weights
associated with each subscale in order to examine the individual contribution of the subscales
above and beyond the other variables in the equation.
Two additional hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed on only events
that qualified as interpersonal events on the TEQ. Variables were entered into the equation in the
same manner as above; however, “event type” was replaced with “emotional closeness to
offender” to assess the influence of this variable in predicting PTSD symptom severity relative to
the influence of the other event and person characteristics examined in this study. In these
analyses, the statistic of interest was the individual beta weight of the variable “relationship with
offender” in both analyses (i.e., with events that meet criterion A and with events that do not
meet criterion A). For persons who indicated rape as their worst event, a one-way ANOVA was
used to compare PTSD symptom means for each category of relationship to offender.
The third hypothesis that cognitive variables will mediate the relationship between
experiencing a trauma and PTSD symptoms was tested through a series of multiple regression
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analyses as outlined by Baron and Kenny’s (1986) paper on the moderator-mediator distinction.
Scores on each measure of cognitive factors were tested for a mediator role by conducting the
following analyses: first, regressing the cognitive variable onto trauma exposure; second,
regressing PTSD symptoms onto trauma exposure; and third, regressing PTSD symptoms on
both trauma exposure and scores on the cognitive measure. At each point, if the model became
non-significant, no further analyses were run, because the data did not support the mediator
hypothesis. Assuming all analyses were significant, a cognitive variable was deemed a mediator
if the final analysis in the series described indicated a decrease in the predictive value of trauma
exposure when scores on the cognitive variable were also included in the model (i.e., predictive
value of trauma exposure is lower in the third analysis than in the second).
The fourth hypothesis, which related to the predictive capacity of retrospective reports of
peritraumatic feelings of anger, shock, or shame, was addressed with two simultaneous multiple
regression analyses, one for events that met criterion A1 and one for events that did not meet
criterion A1. They included the following predictors from the TEQ ratings for participants’
identified worst events: fear, helplessness, horror, anger, shock, and shame. The dependent
variable was PCL-C scores. To avoid a restricted range of scores in the “criterion A-present”
analysis, participants’ responses were included in this analysis if criterion A1 was satisfied
regardless of whether criterion A2 was satisfied. Although participants in this case may not
technically qualify for satisfaction of criterion A (i.e., if they report low feelings of fear,
helplessness, or horror), of interest in this analysis was the ability of criterion A2 and related
peritraumatic feelings to predict PTSD symptom severity. Follow-up analyses were conducted to
examine each combination of significant predictors (e.g., fear and helplessness, horror and fear,
etc.) for its ability to predict PTSD symptom severity.
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Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) procedures were used to test the fifth hypothesis, that
a 4-factor model of reexperiencing, arousal, avoidance, and either dysphoria or numbing would
fit the data. Two separate CFAs were conducted for each of the three measurement models being
tested: one for participants whose worst event satisfied criterion A and another for participants
whose worst event did not satisfy criterion A. Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS) was used
to conduct the CFAs. Maximum likelihood estimation procedures were used to analyze
covariance matrices of the 17 PCL-C items. Three models were tested: the King et al. (1998)
four-factor intercorrelated numbing model, the DSM-IV intercorrelated three-factor model, and
Simms et al.’s (2002) four-factor dysphoria model. Indices of fit that were examined for each
model included the goodness of fit index (GFI), the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), the
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square
residual (RMR). GFI and AGFI values greater than .85 and .80, respectively, denote good fit, but
values above .90 are preferred (Marsh, Balla, & McDonald, 1988). RMSEA and RMR values
less than .05 represent good fit, values of .05 to .08 represent moderate fit, and values of .08 to
.10 represent adequate fit (Brown & Cudeck, 1993). Chi-square values were used to compare the
three models.
The best-fitting model was tested for invariance between the criterion A group and the
non-criterion A group. The groups were compared using a multiple-group analysis in which
successively more stringent constraints on equivalence were imposed on the data to examine the
extent of fit degradation with increasingly stringent constraints. Configural invariance would be
supported by a well-fitting model that has the same number of factors and pattern of loadings,
covariances, and residuals, whereas metric invariance is supported if equality constraints on the
loadings for each factor yield acceptable fit (McArdle, 2007).
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Results
Sample Characteristics
The final sample consisted of 423 college students enrolled in psychology courses at
Eastern Michigan University during Winter or Spring terms of 2009. All volunteered to
participate in this study for extra credit in a psychology course. Participants ranged in age from
18 to 60 years (M = 20.8, SD = 4.7). Sixty-nine percent (n = 292) were women and 30.5 percent
(n = 129) were men. Two participants did not report their sex. The majority of the respondents
identified themselves as European American (63.8%, n = 270). One hundred five (24.8%)
identified themselves as African American, 17 (4.0%) as Hispanic, 11 (2.6%) as Asian, 7 (1.7%)
as Native American, 4 (0.9%) as Arab American, 3 as Indian (0.7%), and 1 (0.2%) as Pacific
Islander. Five participants did not report their racial or ethnic affiliation. Table 3 lists additional
demographic features of this sample.
The original sample consisted of 426 participants, but three participants were excluded
from all analyses because they did not indicate a worst event on the TEQ. Of the 423 retained
participants, 377 completed all measures. Missing values for the 46 participants with missing
values were imputed using the missing value analysis module of SPSS, as described in the Data
Analyses section of this paper.
Event Characteristics
Participants’ reported worst events were examined for their fulfillment of criterion A for
PTSD based on the methodology outlined earlier in this paper. Out of 423 participants, 220
reported a worst event that fulfilled criterion A, and 203 reported a worst event that did not fulfill
criterion A. For those that did not fulfill criterion A, the majority (187) reported a worst event
that did not meet criterion A1 (i.e., threat to life or physical integrity). Sixteen participants
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Sample
Percent

n

Freshman

40.2

170

Sophomores

20.8

88

Juniors

15.1

64

Seniors

14.2

60

Second Degree

1.7

7

Did Not Answer

8.0

34

None

58.4

247

One to Five

15.8

67

Six to Ten

5.4

23

Eleven to Twenty

3.8

16

More Than Twenty

8.5

36

Did Not Answer

8.0

34

Single

84.9

359

Married

4.3

18

Divorced/Separated

2.1

9

Living with Partner

7.5

32

Did Not Answer

1.2

5

Class Standing

Past Therapy Appointments

Relationship Status
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reported an event that satisfied criterion A1 (e.g., unexpected death of someone close, child
abuse, life endangered), but their ratings of their fear, helplessness, or horror did not meet
criterion A2. Of those that met criterion A, the most commonly reported worst events were the
unexpected death of someone close to the participant (31.4%), being in serious danger (23.2%),
child abuse (12.7%), and serious accidents (11.8%). Worst events that did not meet criterion A
were varied, but the most commonly reported worst events were death of a grandparent (18.7%),
romantic break-up (12.8%), parental discord (9.4%), legal problems (7.4%), peer conflict (7.4%),
getting into a minor accident (5.9%), and financial problems (5.4%). Table 4 lists events
according to their prevalence as reported worst events in this sample.
Peritraumatic emotional reactions that were retrospectively assessed included fear,
helplessness, horror, anger, shock, and shame. All were assessed on a scale of 1 to 7, with higher
ratings signifying higher levels of the emotion. Helplessness had the highest average rating (M =
5.9, SD = 1.6), followed by fear (M = 5.5, SD = 1.8), shock (M = 5.4, SD = 1.9), anger (M = 4.9,
SD = 2.1), horror (M = 4.8, SD = 2.0), and shame (M = 3.7, SD = 2.4).
Event characteristics included in analyses were type (i.e., interpersonal, noninterpersonal), relationship to offender for interpersonal events, degree of perceived threat and
injury, event duration, and perception of support. Approximately two-thirds of the sample
(63.1%) reported a worst event that was interpersonal, involving at least one other person in a
direct way (e.g., assault, abuse, death of a loved one, conflict with peers, etc.); the other third of
the sample (36.9%) reported a worst event that was not inherently interpersonal (e.g., natural
disaster, accident, financial problems, etc.). For interpersonal worst events, the mean rating of
emotional closeness to the other party involved was 4.2 out of 7 (SD = 2.0). Participants reported
a mean rating of 2.8 (SD = 2.2) out of 7 on the degree of life threat experienced and 2.0 (SD =
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Table 4
Frequency of Worst Events Reported
Worst Event

Percent

n

31.4

69

Life endangered

23.2

51

Child abuse

12.7

28

Serious accident or fire

11.8

26

Sexual Assault

6.8

15

Witnessed serious injury or death

5.0

11

Victim of non-sexual violent crime

4.1

9

Abusive relationship

4.1

9

Natural Disaster

0.9

2

Criterion A Absent
Death of a grandparent

18.7

38

Romantic break-up

12.8

26

Parent discord/divorce

9.4

19

Legal problems

7.4

15

Peer conflict

7.4

15

Minor accident

5.9

12

Financial problems

5.4

11

Illness in family

4.4

9

Moving

4.4

9

Other

24.2

49

Criterion A Present
Received news of injury or death to someone close
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1.7) on the degree of injury experienced. Of the 423 participants, 274 reported a discrete worst
event that occurred once (e.g., single car accident), 107 reported a discrete worst event that
occurred multiple times (e.g., assaulted twice), 16 reported a chronic event that occurred for less
than one year (e.g., abusive relationship that lasted six months), and 26 reported a chronic event
that occurred for longer than one year (e.g., childhood abuse that lasted two years). Participants
endorsed a relatively high level of perceived support at the time of the event (mean rating = 4.8
out of 7, SD = 2.1) and less support related to the event at the time of the study (mean rating =
3.3, SD = 2.2).
Person Variables
Person variables included in the analyses were sex, age, socioeconomic status, and
trauma history. As indicated previously, approximately two thirds of the sample was female (n =
292) and one third male (n = 129). Two participants did not indicate their sex. Participants
ranged in age from 18 to 60 (M = 20.8, SD = 4.7). The majority (89%) were between 18 and 23.
Family of origin income distribution can be found in Table 5. The modal response to the
qualitative description of income was “solidly middle class,” and the majority of participants
reported that their family income ranged from $25,000 to $99,999.
Participants reported a high level of trauma exposure. The reported number of traumas
experienced by individual participants ranged from 1 to 8 events with a mean of 2.4 (SD = 1.3).
When the TEQ was administered, participants were instructed to write in a “worst event” if they
had not experienced a trauma previously listed, so all participants reported at least one aversive
event. About one half (58.4%) reported experiencing one or two events, 34% reported
experiencing 3-4 events, and 7.6% reported experiencing 5 to 8 different events. The number of
different events was computed by dichotomizing each event into presence or absence and
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Table 5
Family-of-origin Income Estimates
Percent

n

> 150,000

8.0

34

100,000-149,999

9.5

40

75,000-99,999

13.5

57

50,000-74,999

11.6

49

25,000-49,999

10.6

45

10,000-24,999

6.6

28

< 10,000

6.6

28

Unsure

33.6

142

Barely enough to get by

4.7

20

Enough to get by but no more

18.4

78

Solidly middle class

41.4

175

Plenty of extras

18.7

79

Plenty of luxuries

4.7

20

Unsure

12.1

51

Income in Dollars

Perception of Economic Situation

summing the number of traumas classified as “present” for each individual.
Cognitive Characteristics
Avoidance. High scores on the PSWQ are indicative of higher levels of worry. Scores
can range from 16 to 80. Participants in this sample endorsed a moderate level of worry (M =
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49.9, SD = 14.7), with scores ranging from 20 to 80. The mean item rating was a 3.1 on a scale
of 1 to 5.
High scores on the WBSI are associated with higher levels of thought suppression. Scores
can range from 15 to 75. Participants in this sample also endorsed a moderate level of thought
suppression (M = 49.4, SD = 12.7), with scores ranging from 15 to 75. The mean item rating was
a 3.29 on a scale of 1 to 5.
Similar to the PSWQ and WBSI, high scores on the AAQ are indicative of higher use of
avoidance. Scores ranged from 13 to 57 (out of a possible 9 to 63) (M = 34.7, SD = 8.2). The
mean item rating was a 3.9 on a scale of 1 to 5, corresponding to a moderate endorsement of
using avoidance when stressed.
Cognitive schemas. High scores on the PTGI are associated with greater perception of
benefit resulting from participants’ worst events. Total scores can range from 0 to 105. Total
scores ranged from 0 to 105 with a mean of 50.7 and standard deviation of 26.1. Participants in
this sample reported, on average, a small degree of benefit from their stressful experience (mean
item rating = 2.4 on a scale of 0-5). Highest benefits were reported in the areas of appreciation of
life (M = 2.9, SD = 1.5), followed by personal strength (M = 2.7, SD = 1.4), relating to others (M
= 2.3, SD = 1.4), new possibilities (M = 2.1, SD = 1.5), and spiritual change (M = 2.0, SD = 1.9).
Higher scores on the PTCI are associated with more negative posttraumatic cognitions.
Scores ranged from 36 to 230 out of a possible range of 36-252 (M = 82.1, SD = 33.8).
Participants endorsed more positive posttraumatic cognitions, evidenced by an average rating
score of 2.3, which corresponds to a slight disagreement with statements representing negative
cognitions. Participants reported more negative posttraumatic cognitions about the world (M =
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3.4, SD = 1.5) compared to negative cognitions about self (M = 1.8, SD = 0.9) and self-blame (M
= 2.4, SD = 1.5).
Resiliency. Higher scores on the DRI are indicative of more hearty personalities. Scores
ranged from 18 to 84 out of a possible range of 0 to 90, with a mean of 58.1 and standard
deviation of 9.3. Participants endorsed moderate levels of agreement with statements
representing resilience, evidenced by an average item rating of 1.9 on a scale of 0 to 3.
Participants reported a greater endorsement of commitment (M = 21.5, SD = 4.4) than control (M
= 20.1, SD = 3.5) and challenge (M = 16.6, SD = 4.4).
Higher scores on the SES indicate higher degrees of perceived self-efficacy. Scores
ranged from 44 to 313 out of a possible range of 14 to 322 (M = 223.5, SD = 43.4. Participants
endorsed moderate degrees of perceived self-efficacy (average item rating = 9.7 on a scale of 1
to 14). Participants reported a greater sense of general self-efficacy (M = 10.0, SD = 2.0) than
social self-efficacy (M = 8.8, SD = 2.5).
Higher scores on the ACQ are associated with a greater sense of perceived control over
stressors. Scores ranged from 32 to 144 out of a possible 0 to 150 (M = 94.0, SD = 21.1).
Participants endorsed a moderate degree of perceived control, evidenced by an average item
rating of 3.1 on a scale of 0 to 5.
Higher scores on the CSES are associated with a greater estimation of one’s coping
abilities. Scores ranged from 19 to 260 out of a possible 0 to 260 (M = 168.1, SD = 45.6).
Participants endorsed a moderate estimation of their coping abilities, evidenced by an average
item rating of 6.5 on a scale of 0 to 10.
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Trauma Severity
Participants also reported a relatively high level of PTSD symptomology for a nonclinical population. Using the recommended PCL-C cut-off score of 50 (Weathers et al., 1993),
13.9% (n = 59) of the sample fell in the PTSD-probable range. The scores ranged from 17 to 74
out of a possible 17 to 85 (M = 35.3, SD = 12.5). Approximately one third of the sample obtained
scores between 17 and 28, one third between 29 and 39, and one third between 40 and 74.
Predictors of PTSD Symptoms for Criterion A Events (Hypothesis 1)
The first hypothesis is that event, person, and cognitive characteristics would predict
PTSD symptoms in response to events that satisfy criterion A. Bivariate correlations and
multiple regression analyses were used to examine the relationships among these variables. A
one-way ANOVA was also used to test whether mean PTSD scores differed according to
relationship with offender among those who endorsed rape as their worst event.
Zero-order correlations (for continuous variables) and point-biserial correlations (for
categorical variables) between PTSD symptom totals and each independent variable are found in
the “Criterion A” column of Table 6. To reduce the likelihood of committing a Type I error
associated with running multiple tests, a significance level of .01 was used. Consistent with
expectations, higher ratings of life threat and injury at the time of the trauma were both
associated with higher scores on the PCL-C. Perception of support at the time of the event and
perception of support now were not significantly related to PTSD symptoms, but there was a
trend for lower perception of support at the time of the event to be associated with higher PTSD
symptoms. Current age, event type, sex, and income were unrelated to PTSD symptoms. Higher
PTSD scores were associated with a greater number of traumas endorsed. Finally, almost all
scores on cognitive measures were significantly related to PTSD scores in the predicted
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Table 6
Correlations between PTSD Scores and Event, Person, and Cognitive variables
Correlation with PTSD scores
Model Variables

Criterion A

Non-criterion A

Event type

.14

.00

Threat

.16*

.10

Injury

.19*

.20*

Support then

-.11+

-.14

Support now

.09

.08

Sex

.15

.10

Age

-.04

-.09

Trauma History

.22*

.32*

Income

-.01

.05

PSWQ

.42*

.44*

WBSI

.29*

.36*

AAQ

.35*

.53*

PTGI

.32*

.23*

PTCI

.58*

.67*

DRI

-.27*

-.38*

SES

-.27*

-.30*

CSE

-.33*

-.32*

ACQ

-.46*

-.47*

Event Variables

Person Variables

Cognitive Variables

Note: + p < .05, * p < .01
directions. Higher scores on measures of avoidance (i.e., PSWQ, WBSI, and AAQ) and
posttraumatic cognitions (i.e., PTCI) were associated with higher PTSD scores. Higher scores on
measures of resiliency (i.e., DRI, SES, CSE, and ACQ), which corresponded to lower levels of
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perceived helplessness, were associated with lower PTSD scores. The only cognitive variable
that was not associated with PTSD symptoms in the predicted direction was benefit-finding (i.e.,
PTGI), which correlated positively with PTSD symptoms.
The PTGI, PTCI, DRI, and SES each contain several subscales. Zero-order correlations
between PTSD symptom totals and subscales corresponding to these measures are found in the
“Criterion A” column of Table 7. PTSD scores were positively related to scores on all five
subscales of the PTGI. Higher PTSD scores were associated with increased benefits in the areas
of relating to others, perceiving new possibilities, obtaining personal strength, experiencing
spiritual change, and gaining a new appreciation for life. Higher PTSD scores were associated
with higher scores on subscales of the PTCI measuring negative cognitions about self, negative
thoughts about the world, and self-blame. The commitment and control subscales of the DRI
were both negatively associated with PTSD symptom scores. Finally, the general self-efficacy
subscale score was negatively related to PTSD scores, whereas the social self-efficacy subscale
score was unrelated to PTSD scores.
The multiple regression with event characteristics entered into the first block, person
variables into the second block, and cognitive variables into the third block was significant
[F(12, 219) = 15.07, p < .01]. Only variables that were significant bivariate predictors were
included in the model. Variables that were not included were event type, event duration, support
at the time of the event, current support, sex, socioeconomic status, and age. Variables that were
entered into block 1 included degree of perceived threat and degree of injury. Block 2 consisted
of number of previous traumas. Block 3 consisted of scores on cognitive factors related to
avoidance (i.e., scores on the PSWQ, WBSI, and AAQ), posttraumatic cognitions (i.e., scores on
the PTGI and PTCI), and resilience (i.e., scores on the DRI, SES, CSE, and ACQ). Varying the
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Table 7
Correlations between PTSD Scores and Instrument Subscales
Correlation with PTSD scores
Model Variables

Criterion A

Non-criterion A

Relating to others

.23*

.13

New possibilities

.35*

.32*

Personal strength

.24*

.17*

Spiritual change

.23*

.15

Appreciation of life

.31*

.18*

Negative cognitions about self

.57*

.68*

Negative cognitions about world

.48*

.54*

Self-blame

.20*

.32*

Commitment

-.30*

-.32*

Control

-.21*

-.30*

Challenge

-.09

-.26*

General

-.27*

-.32*

Social

-.14

-.13

PTGI

PTCI

DRI

SES

Note: * p < .01

Predictors of PTSD Symptoms 84

order of the blocks did not affect the results. Tolerance values closer to 0 indicate problematic
levels of collinearity. Tolerance statistics for all variables exceeded .74, well above the
suggested cut-off of .10 that indicates a potential problem with collinearity (Merler & Vanatta,
2005). No variables were dropped from the equation. See Table 8 for a summary of significant
predictors for the criterion A group.
The hypothesis that event, person, and cognitive characteristics would predict PTSD
symptom severity was partially supported. When all variables were entered into the equation (see
Block 3 in Table 8), none of the event or person variables were significant predictors of PTSD
symptoms, but 4 of 9 cognitive variables were significant predictors. Higher scores on measures
of negative posttraumatic cognitions (i.e., PTCI scores), perceptions of posttraumatic benefit
(i.e., PTGI scores), and worry (i.e., PSWQ scores) predicted higher PTSD scores when all three
blocks were entered into the model (i.e., Model 3). Lower scores on perception of control (i.e.,
ACQ scores) also predicted higher PTSD scores. Because both the PTCI and the PTGI contain
subscales, this analysis was rerun with total PTCI and PTGI scores replaced with subscale
scores. This model was significant [F(18, 219) = 11.18, p < .01; R² = .46]. Only PTCI subscales
of negative cognitions about self (B = .37, p < .01) and world (B = .20, p < .01) emerged as
significant predictors of PTSD symptoms. A separate regression with “relationship to offender”
added as an event variable was performed on interpersonal events that met criterion A.
Relationship to offender was nonsignificant in this model.
As predicted, greater degree of injury and greater number of previous traumas predicted
higher PTSD symptoms prior to the entry of cognitive variables in Step 3 of the hierarchical
regression (see Models 1 and 2 of Table 8). These event and person characteristics became
nonsignificant when cognitive variables were entered into the model.
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Table 8
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting PTSD Symptoms for
Criterion A Group (N = 220)
Block 1

Block 2
β

B

0.48 0.40

.10

0.26 0.38

0.98 0.48

.15* 0.96 0.47

Block 3
β

B

.05

0.26 0.30

.05

.15*

0.37 0.38

.06

.19**

0.49 0.51

.05

PSWQ

0.12 0.54

.15*

WBSI

-0.04 0.06

-.04

AAQ

0.03 0.11

.02

PTGI

0.11 0.03

.23**

PTCI

0.17 0.03

.42**

DRI

0.06 0.10

.05

SES

0.02 0.02

.07

CSE

-0.01 0.02

-.04

ACQ

-0.10 0.05

-.17*

Variable

B

Threat
Injury

SE B

Trauma History

SE B

1.75 0.63

SE B

R²

.04

.08

.47

F for change in R²

5.04

7.79**

16.74**

β

*p < .05. **p < .01.
Contrary to hypotheses, degree of threat and cognitive variables reflected in scores on the
WBSI, DRI, CSE, AAQ, and SES did not significantly predict PTSD symptoms when event and
person characteristics were entered into the equation.
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There was not a significant difference in PTSD scores by offender type for persons who
reported rape to be their worst event. A one-way ANOVA was used to compare mean PTSD
scores for persons who reported rape by a dating partner, friend or acquaintance, or stranger.
Although other response options were possible for the variable assessing relationship to offender,
only 15 persons reported rape to be their worst event; responses fell into the three categories
listed above. Categories of “friend” and “acquaintance” were combined to produce
approximately similar sample sizes across groups. The model was not significant [F(2, 14) = .28,
ns].
Predictors of PTSD Symptoms for Non-criterion A Events (Hypothesis 2)
The second hypothesis is that event, person, and cognitive characteristics would predict
PTSD symptoms in response to events that do not satisfy criterion A. Bivariate correlations and
multiple regression analyses were used to examine the relationships among these variables in the
same manner as described in the previous section.
Zero-order correlations (for continuous variables) and point-biserial correlations (for
categorical variables) between PTSD symptom totals and each independent variable are found in
the “non-criterion A” column of Table 6. Consistent with expectations and with results from
participants who did meet criterion A, higher ratings of injury at the time of the trauma were
associated with higher scores on the PCL-C. Perception of support at the time of the event and
perception of support now were not significantly related to PTSD symptoms. Current age, sex,
income, and event type were unrelated to PTSD symptoms. Higher PTSD scores were associated
with a greater number of events endorsed. Finally, most scores on cognitive measures were
significantly related to PTSD scores in the predicted directions. The only relationship that was
not consistent with hypotheses was for posttraumatic growth (PTGI). More severe PTSD
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symptoms were associated with greater perceived growth. As predicted, higher scores on
measures of avoidance (i.e., PSWQ, WBSI, and AAQ) and posttraumatic cognitions (i.e., PTCI)
were associated with higher PTSD scores. Higher scores on measures of resiliency (i.e., DRI,
SES, CSE, and ACQ), which corresponded to lower levels of perceived helplessness, were
associated with lower PTSD scores.
Zero-order correlations between PTSD symptom totals and subscales of the PTGI, PTCI,
DRI, and SES among those reporting a non-criterion A event can be found in the second column
of Table 7. PTSD scores were positively related to scores on all three of the five subscales of the
PTGI (i.e., perceiving new possibilities, obtaining personal strength, and gaining a new
appreciation for life). On the PTCI, scores on subscales measuring negative cognitions about
self, negative thoughts about the world, and self-blame were all associated with higher PTSD
symptom scores. The commitment, control, and challenge subscales of the DRI were all
negatively associated with PTSD symptom scores. Finally, general self-efficacy subscale scores
were negatively related to PTSD scores, whereas social self-efficacy subscales scores were
unrelated to PTSD scores.
The multiple regression with event characteristics entered into the first block, person
variables into the second block, and cognitive variables into the third block was significant
[F(20, 202) = 14.86, p < .01]. See Table 9 for a summary of significant predictors for the noncriterion A group. Variables that did not correlate significantly with PTSD scores were not
included in the model. Variables that were not included were event type, event duration,
perception of life threat, support at the time of the event, current support, sex, socioeconomic
status, and age. Degree of injury was entered in Block 1. Block 2 consisted of number of
previous traumas. Block 3 consisted of scores on cognitive factors related to avoidance (i.e.,
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Table 9
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting PTSD Symptoms for
Non-criterion A Group (N = 203)
Block 1

Block 2
β

B

SE B

β

.15*

0.57

0.44

.06

.29**

1.08

0.50

.11*

PSWQ

0.07

0.06

.08

WBSI

0.00

0.06

.00

AAQ

0.39

0.12

.25**

PTGI

0.05

0.03

.11*

PTCI

0.17

0.02

.49**

DRI

-0.05 0.10

-.03

SES

0.04

0.02

.13

CSE

0.05

0.02

.18*

ACQ

-0.14

0.05

-.22*

Variable

B

SE B

Injury

1.82 0.61

Trauma History

β

Block 3

B

SE B

.20** 1.33 0.60
2.87 0.67

R²

.04

.11

.56

F for change in R²

8.77

18.44**

23.50**

*p < .05. **p < .01.
scores on the PSWQ, WBSI, and AAQ), posttraumatic cognitions (i.e., scores on the PTGI and
PTCI), and resilience (i.e., scores on the DRI, SES, CSE, and ACQ). Tolerance statistics for all
variables exceeded .78, well above the recommendation that .10 or less indicates a potential
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problem with collinearity (Mertler & Vana, 2005). Varying the order of the blocks did not affect
the results.
The hypothesis that event, person, and cognitive characteristics would predict PTSD
symptom severity was partially supported. When all variables were entered into the equation (see
Block 3 in Table 9), number of previous traumas and scores on 5 of 9 cognitive measures were
significant predictors of PTSD symptoms. A greater number of endorsed events and higher
scores on measures of negative posttraumatic cognitions (i.e., PTCI scores), perceptions of
posttraumatic benefit (i.e., PTGI scores), coping self-efficacy (i.e., CSE scores), and avoidance
(i.e., AAQ scores) predicted greater PTSD symptom severity. Lower scores on a measure of
perceived control (i.e., ACQ) also predicted higher PTSD scores. Because the PTCI and PTGI
contain subscales, this analysis was rerun with total PTCI and PTGI scores replaced with
subscale scores. This model was significant [F(17, 202) = 18.77, p < .01; R² = .63]. The PTCI
subscale of negative cognitions about self and the PTGI subscale of perceiving new possibilities
emerged as significant predictors of PTSD symptoms (B = .54 and .26, respectively, p < .01). A
separate regression with “event type” replaced by “relationship to offender” was performed on
interpersonal events that did not meet criterion A. Relationship to offender was nonsignificant in
this model.
As predicted, greater degree of injury predicted higher PTSD symptoms prior the entry of
cognitive variables in Step 3 of the hierarchical regression (see Blocks 1 and 2 of Table 8). This
relationship became nonsignificant when cognitive variables were entered into the model.
Contrary to hypotheses, cognitive variables reflected in scores on the SBSI, DRI, SES,
and PSWQ did not significantly predict PTSD symptoms when event and person characteristics
were entered into the equation.
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Cognitive Variables as Mediators (Hypothesis 3)
The third hypothesis that cognitive variables would mediate the relationship between
experiencing a trauma and PTSD symptoms was not supported. Trauma exposure (i.e., criterion
A met or unmet) did not significantly predict total scores on the PCL-C [F(1, 422) = 1.81, ns], so
further analyses were unnecessary.
Predictive Ability of Criterion A2 (Hypothesis 4)
The fourth hypothesis was that retrospective ratings of peritraumatic feelings of anger,
shock, shame, fear, helplessness, and horror would predict PCL-C scores. It was addressed with
two simultaneous multiple regression analyses, one for events that met criterion A1 and one for
events that did not meet criterion A1.
The regression analysis for events that met criterion A1 was significant [F(6, 235) = 6.15,
p < .01]. The only rating to significantly predict PCL-C scores, however, was for peritraumatic
feelings of anger (B = .211, p < .01). Ratings of shock, shame, fear, helplessness, and horror did
not significantly predict PTSD symptom severity.
The regression analysis for events that did not meet criterion A1 was also significant
[F(6, 186) = 4.95, p < .01]. Again, the only rating to significantly predict PCL-C scores was for
peritraumatic feelings of anger (B = .239, p < .01).
Factor Structure of PTSD (Hypothesis 5)
The fifth hypothesis was that King et al.’s (1998) four-factor intercorrelated numbing
model and Simms et al.’s (2002) intercorrelated four-factor dysphoria model would fit the data
better than the DSM-IV intercorrelated three-factor model. Table 10 shows how PCL-C items
map onto each factor model.
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Table 10
Item Mapping for Confirmatory Analyses
Model
DSM-IV symptom

3-factor

4-factor numbing 4-factor dysphoria

1. (B1) Disturbing memories

R

R

R

2. (B2) Disturbing dreams

R

R

R

3. (B3) Suddenly reliving

R

R

R

4. (B4) Upset when reminded

R

R

R

5. (B5) Physical reactions when reminded

R

R

R

6. (C1) Avoiding thinking

A, N

A

A

7. (C2) Avoiding activities

A, N

A

A

8. (C3) Trouble remembering

A, N

N

D

9. (C4) Loss of interest

A, N

N

D

10. (C5) Feeling distant

A, N

N

D

11. (C6) Emotionally numb

A, N

N

D

12. (C7) Future cut short

A, N

N

D

13. (D1) Trouble sleeping

H

H

D

14. (D2) Irritable/angry outbursts

H

H

D

15. (D3) Difficulty concentrating

H

H

D

16. (D4) Being “super-alert”

H

H

H

17. (D5) Jumpy/easily startled

H

H

H

Note. DSM-IV = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). R = reexperiencing, A = avoidance, N = numbing, H
= hyperarousal (arousal), D = dysphoria
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Table 11 contains results for each of the 3-factor models tested with the whole sample (n
= 423), participants with criterion A present (n = 220), and participants with criterion A absent (n
= 203). As hypothesized, the 4-factor models both fit the data better than the 3-factor model did.
Fit indices suggest that the 4-factor dysphoria model provides the best fit to the data from the
whole sample and from participants with criterion A present. For participants with a worst
trauma that does not meet criterion A, however, the 4-factor numbing model provides a slightly
better fit to the data than does the 4-factor dysphoria model. It should be noted that the fit indices
for the whole sample are the most acceptable, although RMSEA values closer to .05 are
preferred. Fit indices for the groups (criterion A and non-criterion A) are not as strong as the fit
indices for the combined group. The hypothesis, however, was to test whether the 4-factor
numbing and dysphoria model fit the data better than the 3-factor DSM model. The data support
this hypothesis.
Because the 4-factor dysphoria model was favored in the data from the whole sample and
from participants with criterion A present, it was used to examine factorial invariance across the
two groups (i.e., criterion A present and criterion A absent). Table 12 shows fit indices when
factor loadings were free and for when they were constrained to be equal across the two samples.
The first row (i.e., “Fully [all factor loadings] free”) suggests configural invariance; all fit indices
show good to acceptable fit. The second row (i.e., “Fully [all factor loadings] fixed”) lists the
results when factor loadings for each symptom cluster (i.e., reexperiencing, avoidance,
dysphoria, hyperarousal) were constrained to be equal. Compared to the fully free findings,
constraints on the loadings do not damage model-data fit (∆χ²(13) = 18.02, ns); therefore, metric
invariance is also supported. The results of this analysis suggests that the 4-factor dysphoria
model fits both samples (i.e., criterion A present and criterion A absent) equally well.

Predictors of PTSD Symptoms 93

Table 11
Goodness-of-fit Statistics for PCL-C Models

χ²

df

GFI

AFGI

RMSEA

RMR

3-factor

420.17

116

.89

.85

.08

.09

4-factor numbing

330.50

113

.91

.88

.07

.07

89.67

4-factor dysphoria

294.84

113

.92

.90

.06

.07

125.33

3-factor

312.26

116

.85

.80

.09

.12

4-factor numbing

275.45

113

.87

.82

.08

.10

36.81

4-factor dysphoria

245.17

113

.89

.84

.07

.09

67.09

3-factor

305.57

116

.86

.81

.09

.09

4-factor numbing

255.63

113

.88

.83

.08

.08

49.94

4-factor dysphoria

261.47

113

.83

.83

.08

.08

44.10

Model

Δχ ²

Total Sample

Criterion A Present

Criterion A absent

Discussion
This study examined the relative contributions of event and personal characteristics in the
severity of PTSD symptoms in response to events that do and do not meet criterion A. The
present investigation had several aims. First, it was designed to assess the relative contribution of
event and person characteristics to PTSD symptoms in a sample of persons exposed to a variety
of types of trauma. Second, it was designed to assess the predictors of PTSD symptoms in
response to events that do not satisfy criterion A (in its entirety) in the DSM-IV’s diagnostic
system. Third, this study reexamined the nature of PTSD as described in the DSM-IV by
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Table 12
Factorial Invariance of 4-Factor Dysphoria Model across Samples
Model

χ²

df

GFI

AFGI

RMSEA

RMR

Fully (all factor loadings) free

506.65

226

.88

.84

.05

.09

Fully (all factor loadings) fixed

524.67

239

.88

.84

.05

.10

Reexperiencing factor loadings free

520.53

235

.88

.84

.05

.09

Avoidance factor loadings free

524.30

238

.88

.84

.05

.09

Dysphoria factor loadings free

511.30

232

.88

.84

.05

.09

Hyperarousal factor loadings free

524.57

238

.88

.84

.05

.09

assessing the impact of expanding criterion A2 to include other emotional reactions and by
reexamining the factor structure of PTSD symptoms. The overall goal of this paper was to
examine whether current models of PTSD can be extended to explain the development of PTSDlike responses to non-criterion A events.
The first two hypotheses related to the predictors of PTSD symptoms for events that meet
criterion A and events that do not satisfy criterion A. It was expected that event, person, and
cognitive factors would predict PTSD symptoms for both types of events but that cognitive
factors would emerge as stronger predictors of PTSD symptoms for non-criterion A events than
for criterion A events. Results generally supported this prediction. When all variables were
entered into the predictive model, cognitive variables were the strongest predictors of PTSD
symptom severity for both qualifying and nonqualifying events, but a greater number of
cognitive factors emerged as significant predictors for events that did not meet criterion A than
for events that did meet criterion A. Additionally, the beta weights for significant cognitive
predictors of PTSD symptoms were slightly larger in the non-criterion A group for all but
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posttraumatic benefits and worry (i.e., PTGI and PSWQ scores, respectively). The predictors of
PTSD symptoms for the criterion A group in order of strength were posttraumatic cognitions
(PTCI scores; B = .42), posttraumatic growth (PTGI scores; B = .23), perception of control (ACQ
scores; B = -.17), and worry (B = .15). The predictors of PTSD symptoms for the non-Criterion
A group in order of strength were posttraumatic cognitions (PTCI scores; B = .49), use of
avoidance (AAQ scores; B = .25), perception of control (ACQ scores; B = -.22), coping selfefficacy (CSE scores; B = .18), posttraumatic growth (PTGI scores; B = .11), and trauma history
(B = .11).
Although the cross-sectional nature of this study precludes explanations of cause-andeffect, the finding that cognitive variables were such strong predictors of PTSD symptoms
compared to event and person factors supports cognitive models of the etiology of PTSD that
suggest that PTSD symptoms arise from avoidance (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989),
the presence of information incompatible with pre-existing cognitive schemas (Janoff-Bulman,
1989; Wells, 2000), and the perception of helplessness (Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988; Seligman,
1975). This study suggests that cognitive vulnerabilities predict PTSD symptoms above and
beyond the effect of event and more distal person characteristics and provides an explanation for
why people sometimes develop PTSD-like responses to events that do not meet criterion A
(Bodkin, Pope, Detke, & Hudson, 2007) and why many people never develop PTSD after
experiencing events that meet criterion A (Kessler et al., 1995). Longitudinal studies, however,
are needed to test the hypothesis that cognitive vulnerabilities contribute to PTSD development
and maintenance.
Although cognitive variables were the strongest predictors of PTSD symptom severity,
some additional variables emerged as significant predictors of PCL-C scores prior to the entry of
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cognitive variables in Step 3 of the model. In the cluster of event characteristics, degree of injury
predicted symptoms for both the criterion A group and the non-criterion A group. These findings
support other research that suggests that PTSD risk is elevated when persons are exposed to an
event that is rated as producing more bodily injury (e.g., Kilpatrick et al., 1989). In the cluster of
person variables, trauma history also emerged a significant predictor of PTSD symptoms prior to
the entry of cognitive variables into the model for the non-criterion A group. Trauma history
remained significant when cognitive variables were entered into the model for the criterion A
group. This is consistent with studies that show an elevated risk of PTSD with exposure to
multiple traumas (e.g., Kessler et al., 1995).
An unexpected finding was that greater coping self-efficacy (i.e., higher CSE scores) was
predictive of higher PTSD scores in the non-criterion A group. Although the zero-order
correlation was in the predicted direction of higher coping scores associated with lower PTSD
scores, the independent contribution of coping scores to variability in PTSD scores when other
measures were included was in the other direction. An examination of bivariate correlations
between the CSE and other measures suggests that scores on the CSE correlate moderately with
DRI scores (.61), ACQ scores (.65), and AAQ scores (-.59). When DRI, ACQ, and AAQ scores
are excluded from the regression model, CSE scores relate to PTSD scores in the predicted
direction, albeit this relationship is nonsignificant. This finding suggests that other variables in
the model suppress the relationship between coping self-efficacy scores and PTSD severity. It is
also important to note here that there was an order effect for the other measure of self-efficacy,
the SES. When it was administered slightly earlier in the sequence of measures (Sequence 1:
DRI, SES, ACQ, CSES, WBSI, AAQ, and PSWQ), scores were lower than when it was
administered later (Sequence 2: PSWQ, DRI, SES, ACQ, AAQ, CSES, and WBSI). The only
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difference in measures preceding the SES between the sequences is that persons who completed
Sequence 1 completed the worry questionnaire (PSWQ) prior to their completion of the general
coping measure (SES). It is possible that the PSWQ primed participants to rate their coping to be
less effective than did participants who had not completed the PSWQ yet. Further studies should
examine the effects of mood manipulation on scores on measures of coping to determine whether
participants’ moods influence their responses to measures.
Event characteristics of trauma duration, social support surrounding the event, and event
type did not correlate significantly with PTSD symptom severity in either group. It is likely that
event duration was not significant in this sample due to the relative lack of variability on this
item; the majority of the sample (n = 381) reported discrete events, whereas a minority (n = 42)
reported chronic events. Studies examining the relationship between PTSD and event duration
tend to use samples of persons who have all been exposed to chronic traumas, such as combat
exposure (e.g., Buydens-Branchey & Noumair, 1990).
Although social support did not predict PTSD symptom severity for either group, there
was a trend for lower perceived support at the time of the event to relate to higher PTSD scores
(r = -.14, p = .05) in the non-criterion A group, which is consistent with research demonstrating a
negative relationship between support and PTSD symptoms (e.g., Hyman, 2003). A limitation of
this study is that social support at the time of the event was assessed by a single item assessing
retrospective perceptions of support. Perceptions of support at the time of an event may change
over time. Evidence for a bias in recall of social support over time was found in a study by
Norris and Kaniasty (1992) that compared ratings of social support after a hurricane over a 9month interval. The authors found that ratings of social support increased over time.
Longitudinal studies that assess perceived social support shortly after an event, therefore, would
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be helpful to determine whether perceptions of support at the time of the event predict
subsequent symptom development. There is some evidence that social support does predict
PTSD symptoms later in time. Kaniasty and Norris (2008) used structural equation modeling to
suggest a causal relationship between higher levels of perceived social support at 6-months postdisaster and less PTSD at 12 months post-disaster. More longitudinal studies of this nature are
necessary to support the theory that lower levels of social support contribute to the development
of PTSD.
Although event type did not emerge as a significant predictor of PTSD symptoms, a t-test
comparing PTSD symptom severity means between interpersonal events and non-interpersonal
events indicates that persons in the criterion A group who reported a worst event of an
interpersonal nature had significantly higher PTSD scores (M = 37.19, SD = 11.93) than did
persons who reported a worst event of a non-interpersonal nature (M = 33.8, SD = 11.69). This
finding supports other research that suggests that PTSD risk is elevated when persons are
exposed to an event that is of an interpersonal nature (e.g., Kessler et al., 1995).
The event characteristic of perception of life threat was significantly related to PTSD
symptom severity in the criterion A group, but this relationship was not significant in the noncriterion A group. Life threat became nonsignificant in the criterion A group when degree of
injury was included in the model. The positive relationship between life threat and degree of
injury (r = .44, p < .01) indicates that persons who rated degree of injury more highly also tended
to rate life threat more highly. It is not surprising that life threat did not relate to PTSD symptom
severity in the non-criterion A group, because very few events in this group involved life threat
(see Table 4).
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In the cluster of person characteristics, sex, age, and income did not relate to PTSD
symptoms in either group. The lack of a significant relationship between age and PTSD
symptoms is consistent with findings from Kessler et al.’s (1995) epidemiological study of
persons in the United States. The finding that income was unrelated to PTSD symptom severity
is inconsistent with the majority of studies that find a negative relationship between income and
PTSD symptoms (e.g., Cwikel et al., 2008; Sutker et al., 1990; Tennant et al., 1986). A limitation
of using college students is that they reported their parents’ SES and likely were unaware of their
parents’ actual income. Also, years of education varied little in this sample, so it could not be
used as a measure of SES. It is surprising, however, that female sex did not predict PTSD
symptoms. Mean PTSD symptom scores, however, were significantly higher in women than in
men [t(419)=2.64, p < .01]. The mean for women on the PCL was 36.3 (SD=12.5); for men, it
was 32.9 (SD=12.1). Because the age of the sample varied very little, future studies should
examine sex differences in PTSD severity at different age and education levels. It is possible that
the homogeneity of age and education in this sample resulted in a smaller sex difference in PTSD
symptom severity that might be found in samples with more variability in demographic
variables.
Most cognitive variables were associated with PTSD symptoms in the predicted direction
in zero-order correlations. Experiential avoidance (AAQ, PSQ, and WBSI scores) and negative
core beliefs (PTCI scores) were associated with greater PTSD symptom severity, whereas
hardiness (DRI scores) and self-efficacy (SES, CSES, and ACQ scores) were associated with
lower PTSD symptom severity. These findings are consistent with studies that show an elevated
risk of PTSD with the presence of cognitive risk factors, such as worry (e.g., Roussis & Wells,
2006), experiential avoidance (e.g., Steil & Ehlers, 2000), and negative core beliefs (Foa et al.,
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1999). The findings of this study also support research that suggests that PTSD risk is lower
when persons endorse higher levels of hardiness (King et al., 1999), and self-efficacy (Benight et
al., 1997). The finding that benefit-finding was positively associated with PTSD symptoms is
inconsistent with theory that posits that benefit-finding may represent adequate emotional
processing of an event (McMillen et al., 1997); however, this finding is consistent with the
majority of studies that find benefit-finding to be positively associated with PTSD symptoms
(e.g., McMillen & Fisher, 1998, Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). This finding supports the
implication suggested by Tedeschi and Calhoun that perception of benefit may be triggered by
severity of negative symptoms associated with the stressor.
As mentioned earlier, cognitive variables emerged as the strongest predictors of PTSD
symptoms for both the criterion A group and the non-criterion A group. The finding that
posttraumatic cognitions and benefit-finding predicted PTSD symptoms in both groups provides
the most evidence for the cognitive theory of PTSD that implicates the inadequate incorporation
of trauma-related information into preexisting schemas (Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Wells, 2000).
This study also provides some support for theories of PTSD that highlight the role of avoidance
in keeping memories from consolidating (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989); the use of
experiential avoidance predicted PTSD symptoms for the non-criterion A group. Only one of
four measures of coping significantly predicted PTSD symptoms in the predicted direction (i.e.,
perception of control), so there is limited support for the theories of PTSD that posit that the
perception of helplessness contributes to inadequate coping (Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988;
Seligman, 1975).
This study supports current theoretical models of PTSD but suggests that a combination
of all three models (i.e., conflicting schemas, avoidance, and helplessness) may best describe the
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development of PTSD. Findings from this study highlight the role of negative posttraumatic
cognitions, the perception of a lack of control over events and emotions, and the tendency to
avoid thinking about stressful experiences in the development of PTSD symptoms. A revised
model is proposed that integrates components of current models of PTSD. This integrative model
suggests that persons who respond to trauma with negative beliefs about themselves and the
world likely experience stronger emotional reactions than persons who respond with more
adaptive beliefs. High levels of distress, coupled with a belief that one cannot control these
reactions nor prevent future stressors, could lead to greater avoidance of emotions and thoughts
associated with stressors. The faulty cognitions and associated distress could lead to
reexperiencing and hyperarousal symptoms that further increase distress and motivate a person to
engage in greater avoidance. The use of avoidance may serve to maintain faulty cognitions and
the belief that one cannot control emotional reactions or future stressors, resulting in a cycle that
maintains PTSD symptoms over time. This model integrates learned helplessness models (e.g.,
Seligman, 1975), models that implicate faulty cognitions (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Wells,
2000), and avoidance models (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989) of PTSD
development. This model could be tested in longitudinal studies that use structural equation
modeling analyses to test models of causal relationships among posttraumatic beliefs,
perceptions of helplessness, use of avoidance, and PTSD symptoms.
There was not a significant relationship between trauma exposure (defined as
experiencing an event that satisfied criterion A1) and PTSD symptoms in this sample, so
cognitive variables could not be tested for mediation. PTSD symptom severity did not differ
between the criterion A group and the non-criterion A group [t(421)=1.3, ns]. It is possible that
trauma and PTSD symptoms were not related in this study, because participants who did not
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experience a qualifying event may have selected a “worst experience” that was associated with
current distress, artificially elevating PTSD symptoms compared to persons who reported a worst
experience further in the past that met criterion A. Future research should control for “time since
event” when testing whether cognitive variables mediate the relationship between trauma
exposure and PTSD symptoms.
This study also examined the predictive ability of an expanded A2 criterion. Interestingly,
ratings of fear, horror, and helplessness did not predict PTSD symptoms, but ratings of anger did
predict PTSD symptoms for both the criterion A group and the non-criterion A group. This is
consistent with Brewin et al.’s (2000) finding that heightened levels of anger with others and
shame predicted PTSD in the absence of reported initial fear, helplessness, or horror.
The literature on the predictive ability of criterion A2 indicates that the relationship between
peritraumatic feelings and PTSD is not clear. Some studies find that fear, helplessness, and
horror do indeed predict PTSD symptoms (e.g., Brewin et al.), whereas others find that only
helplessness predicts PTSD symptoms (e.g., Roemer et al., 1998b). The current study utilized a
nonclinical sample of persons who retrospectively rated their responses to events, and the
majority of participants did not qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD. More longitudinal studies are
needed that assess criterion A2 near the time of a potentially traumatic event and track
participants for several months to determine whether feelings near the time of the event predict
subsequent PTSD.
The factor structure of the PCL-C supported the hypothesis that King et al.’s (1998) fourfactor intercorrelated numbing model and Simms et al.’s (2002) intercorrelated four-factor
dysphoria model would fit the data better than the DSM-IV intercorrelated three-factor model.
Simms et al.’s dysphoria model fit the data best, and factorial invariance was established for the

Predictors of PTSD Symptoms 103

two groups (criterion A and non-criterion A). This is consistent with findings from samples of
Gulf War veterans (Simms et al.), undergraduates (Baschnagel et al., 2005; Hoyt & Yeater,
2007), and motor vehicle accident survivors (Elklit & Shevlin, 2007).
The results of this study support the role of cognition in PTSD. Negative posttraumatic
cognitions about self and world, self-blame, perception of lack of control, and avoidance were
strong predictors of PTSD above and beyond the influence of event and personal demographic
and history data. Cognitive factors were strong predictors of PTSD symptoms for events that met
criterion A as well as for non-criterion A events. The finding that cognitive factors were stronger
predictors of PTSD symptoms for non-criterion A events than for criterion A events supports the
diathesis-stress model of PTSD. Some people may have cognitive styles that predispose them to
the development of PTSD-like responses to events that may not even qualify for criterion A.
Although predictors of PTSD varied for criterion A versus non-criterion A events, the factor
structure was similar, suggesting that trauma responses to non-criterion A events may look very
similar to trauma responses to criterion A events. In other words, PTSD is PTSD, but some
people are predisposed to develop it in response to subthreshold (i.e., non-criterion A) events.
Future research should examine this phenomenon in a clinical population in which more
people meet criteria for PTSD symptoms. This study utilized a nonclinical sample with a low
prevalence of PTSD (estimated 13.9%). Interestingly, of the 59 persons who exceeded the PCLC cut-off of 50, there was an almost equal split between criterion A and non-criterion A events
(i.e., 31 met criterion A and 28 did not). This statistic suggests that findings from a clinical
sample may mirror the results from this sample.
Future research should also use a clinical interview, such as the gold standard in PTSD
diagnosis, the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake et al., 1995). Some limitations
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of the current study could also be addressed, such as broadening the sample in terms of education
and age. Factors such as socioeconomic status and age may emerge as predictors of PTSD
symptoms in a sample with more variation in these variables.
The cross-sectional nature of the data is a factor that limits the conclusions that can be
drawn from this study. Future research should track participants over the course of several years
to determine whether pre-trauma cognitive styles actually predict development of PTSD
symptoms in response to subsequent potentially-traumatic events. Additionally, criterion A2
cannot be reliably assessed in a cross-sectional study. Retrospective reports of feelings
immediately after a trauma may be biased by current levels of distress. Although the assessment
of criterion A2 immediately after trauma in a research study is usually not feasible, laboratory
experiments with mood induction could examine the relationship between current mood and
retrospective reports of emotions following a traumatic event.
This study suggests that a reevaluation of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD is warranted.
Symptoms do not form the three-factor model outlined in the DSM-IV but rather a four-factor
model similar to what has been found in the majority of factor analytic results of PTSD measures
(e.g., Asmundson et al., 2000; King & King, 1994; Norris et al., 2001; Simms et al., 2002).
Further, the same model fit data from persons who reported a worst event that met criterion A
and from persons who reported a worst event that did not meet criterion A. The similarity in
model fit suggests that PTSD from “trauma” and PTSD from “nonqualifying events” have the
same presentation. This challenges the assumption that the satisfaction of criterion A is a
necessary component of the diagnosis. Similarly, the finding that cognitive variables were the
strongest predictors of PTSD symptoms for both the criterion A and the non-criterion A group
also challenges the notion that characteristics of an event are a primary component in the
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development of PTSD. As suggested by proponents of cognitive models of PTSD (e.g., Ehlers &
Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989; Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988; Seligman,
1975; Wells, 2000), a person’s cognitive reaction to an event is more important than the event
itself in the development of PTSD. The importance of cognitions in a person’s response to an
event underlies the success of treatments that address cognitive processing, such as exposurebased therapies and broader cognitive-behavioral therapies.
The findings of this study fit relatively well with the DSM-V task force’s recently
released proposal for changes in the diagnostic criteria of PTSD. The members of the task force
have recommended a 4-factor model that includes clusters of reexperiencing symptoms,
avoidance, negative changes in cognitions or mood, and hyperarousal symptoms. These
recommendations are consistent with findings from this study, specifically in the strong
relationship between posttraumatic cognitions and PTSD symptoms in the current sample. Their
suggestion to discard criterion A2 but add a symptom of pervasive negative emotional states
(i.e., fear, horror, anger, guilt, or shame) to the criteria is also supported by findings from the
current study and other literature suggesting that feelings of anger, guilt, and shame are often
associated with PTSD symptoms (i.e., Brewin et al., 2000).
In addition to implications for the diagnostic criteria for PTSD, this study adds to the
body of literature that highlights the importance of further examining the link between cognitions
and PTSD. Specifically, longitudinal studies could determine whether pre-trauma cognitive
styles predict PTSD symptoms after a potentially-traumatic event. Studies could also examine
the stability of cognitive styles (i.e., views about self, world, and others) over time.
Results from longitudinal studies that explain the relationship between cognitions and the
development of PTSD could inform treatment outcome studies as well. Treatment outcome
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studies could examine changes in posttraumatic cognitions and other cognitive styles following
therapy. Foa and Rauch (2004) found that posttraumatic cognitions about self, world, and selfblame became significantly more positive after 54 female survivors of assault received 9 to 12
weekly sessions of prolonged exposure therapy. It is currently unknown, however, whether
evidence-based treatments, such as cognitive processing therapy and prolonged exposure, can
alter both cognitions directly related to the impact of trauma (i.e., posttraumatic cognitions,
posttraumatic growth) as well as more general cognitive styles (i.e., experiential avoidance,
worry, self-efficacy). If longitudinal studies implicate cognitive factors in the development of
PTSD and if treatment outcome studies suggest that certain treatments can alter cognitions, then
treatments could actually serve as a protective factor against the development of future stressrelated symptoms.
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Appendix A
Demographics Questionnaire
Age: _________
Sex:

Female

Male

Some people identify themselves as belonging to one or more racial or ethnic groups. Please
check the box(es) below which correspond to group(s) you belong to:
White or Caucasian
Black or African-American
Hispanic or Latino
Native American
Alaskan Native
Asian
Pacific Islander
Do you consider yourself to be of any other race or ethnic group? Yes
If so, what is it?
Marital status: (Check one answer.)
Married
Single
Divorced
Remarried
Widowed
Separated
Living with partner
Same Sex
Other Sex ___
Living Arrangements: (Check one answer.)
Family
Alone
One Roommate
Two or Three Roommates
Large Group (more than three roommates)
Annual household income of family of origin: (Check one answer.)
≥$150,000
$100,000-$149,999
$75,000-$99,999
$50,000-$74,999
$25,000-$49,999
$10,000-$24,999
≤$9,999
Don’t know, or prefer not to say

No
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How would you describe the economic situation of your family as you were growing up?
(Check one answer.)
We had barely enough to get by
We had enough to get by, but no more
We were solidly middle class
We had plenty of “extras”
We had plenty of “luxuries”
Don’t know/unsure/prefer not to say
School Status: (Check one answer.)
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Graduate Student
Other ___________
Number of Past Therapy Sessions (for any reason): (Check one answer.)
0
1-5
6-10
11-20
> 20
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Appendix B
Traumatic Events Questionnaire-Revised
Event Scale-Civilian

DIRECTIONS: This questionnaire is comprised of a variety of traumatic events that you may have experienced.
For each of the following "numbered" questions, indicate whether or not you experienced the event. If you have
experienced one of the events, circle "Yes" and complete the "lettered" items immediately following it that ask for
more details. If you have not experienced the event, circle "No" and go to the next "numbered" item.

No Yes 1. Have you been in or witnessed a serious industrial, farm, or car
accident, or a large fire or explosion?
a. How many times? once  twice  three + 
b. How old were you at that time(s)? 1st ____ 2nd____ 3rd____
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. What was the event? _________________________
h. Was alcohol or a recreational drug a factor in this event? Indicate your answers below.
I was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Somebody else involved was intoxicated.
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t know
No Yes 2.

Have you received news of the mutilation, serious injury, or violent or
unexpected death of someone close to you?


a. How many times? once  twice  three + 
b. How old were you at that time(s)? 1st____ 2nd____ 3rd____
c. What relation was this person to you? ____________________
d. What happened to the person in general terms (e.g., accident, shooting, suicide, etc.)?
______________________________
e. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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No Yes 3. Have you been in a natural disaster such as a tornado, hurricane, flood or major
earthquake?
 a. How many times? once  twice  three + 
b. How old were you at that time(s)? 1st____ 2nd____ 3rd____
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. What was the event? _________________________
h. Was alcohol or a recreational drug a factor in this event? Indicate your answers below.
I was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
No Yes 4. Have you been a victim of a nonsexual violent crime such as robbery or assault?


a. How many times? once  twice  three + 
b. How old were you at that time(s)? 1st____ 2nd____ 3rd____
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. What was the crime? _________________________
h. What was your relationship to the assailant?
Relative
Please specify the relationship (e.g., sibling, cousin, etc.). __________________
Friend
Acquaintance
Stranger
Other, please specify ___________________________
i. How emotionally close were you to the assailant prior to the event?
Not at all close
Extremely close
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j. Was alcohol or a recreational drug a factor in this event? Indicate your answers below.
I was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The offender was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t know
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No Yes 5. As a child, were you the victim of either physical or sexual abuse?


a. How old were you when it began? ______
b. How old were you when it ended? ______
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. Was the assailant male or female? Male  Female  Both 
h. How was the assailant related to you?
Parent/Step-parent
Sibling/Step-sibling
Other relative
Please specify the relationship (e.g., cousin, grandparent). __________________
Family friend
Acquaintance (either of yours or of a family member)
Stranger
Other, please specify ___________________________
i. How emotionally close were you to the assailant prior to the event?
Not at all close
Extremely close
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j. Check all categories that describe the experience . . .
physical abuse
there was sexual penetration of the mouth, anus, or vagina
there was no sexual penetration, but the assailant attempted to force you to complete
such an act
there was some other form of sexual contact e.g., touched your sexual organs, or forced
you to touch assailant's sexual organs
no sexual contact occurred, however, the assailant attempted to touch your sexual
organs, or make you touch his/her sexual organs

Predictors of PTSD Symptoms 135

No Yes 6.

As an adult, have you had any unwanted sexual experiences that involved
the threat or use of force?
 a. How many times? once  twice  three + 
b. How old were you at that time(s)? 1st____ 2nd____ 3rd____
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. Was the assailant male or female? Male  Female  Both 
h. What was your relationship to the assailant?
Relative
Please specify the relationship (e.g., sibling, cousin, etc.). __________________
Friend
Acquaintance
Stranger
Dating partner
Other, please specify ___________________________
i. How emotionally close were you to the assailant prior to the event?
Not at all close
Extremely close
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j. Check (√ ) all categories that describe the experience . . .
there was sexual penetration of the mouth, anus, or vagina
there was no sexual penetration, but the assailant
attempted to force you to complete such an act
there was some other form of sexual contact e.g., touched
your sexual organs, or forced you to touch assailant's sexual organ
no sexual contact occurred, however, the assailant attempted to
touch your sexual organs, or make you touch his/her sexual organs
k. Was alcohol or a recreational drug a factor in this event? Indicate your answers below.
I was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The offender was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t know
i. Do you believe you were drugged (i.e., the “date rape drug”)?yes no not sure
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No Yes 7.

Have you witnessed someone who was mutilated, seriously injured,
or violently killed?


a. How many times? once  twice  three + 
b. How old were you at that time(s)? 1st____ 2nd____ 3rd____
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. Was alcohol or a recreational drug a factor in this event? Indicate your answers below.
I was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The offender was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t know
No Yes 8. As an adult, have you ever been in a relationship in which you were abused
either physically or sexually?




a. How old were you when it began? ______
b. How old were you when it ended? ______
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. What was your relationship to the perpetrator?
Dating partner
Spouse
Other, please specify ___________________________
h. How emotionally close were you to the assailant prior to the event?
Not at all close
Extremely close
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i. Was alcohol or a recreational drug a factor in this/these event/s? Indicate your answers below.
I was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot of the times
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The offender was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot of the times
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t know
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No Yes 9. Have you ever had any other very traumatic event like these (e.g., almost drowning, suicide
attempt, serious illness, surgery, miscarriage, abortion, combat experience, kidnapping,
getting attacked by an animal, being a refugee)?


a. How many times? once  twice  three + 
b. How old were you at that time(s)? 1st____ 2nd____ 3rd____
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. What was the event? ___________________________
h. Was alcohol or a recreational drug a factor in this event? Indicate your answers below.
I was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The offender was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t know Not applicable

10 . If you answered "No" to all questions, or if none of the events you listed was very traumatic for you,
please describe briefly the most traumatic thing to happen to you. To help you remember, on the next page, we have
included a list of events that some people find very stressful. You may endorse something from this list or identify
an event not listed that was your most stressful experience. What was the event?

________________________________________________________________

`

a. How many times? once  twice  three + 
b. How old were you at that time(s)? 1st___ 2nd___ 3rd___
c. Were you injured?
Not at all
Severely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Did you feel your life was threatened?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How traumatic was this for you at that time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How traumatic is this for you now?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. Was alcohol or a recreational drug a factor in this event? Indicate your answers below.
I was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The offender was intoxicated
Not at all
A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t know Not applicable
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List of Stressful Experiences
This list is to be used in conjunction with item #10. If none of the events listed previously on the
TEQ was very traumatic for you or if you did not experience any of those events, please use this
list as a guide to help you identify your most stressful experience to write in item #10.

Parents’ divorce
Serious financial problems
Breaking a limb
Experiencing verbal abuse
Moving to a new place to live
Breaking up with somebody
A relative or other person dying even though it was expected (e.g., from cancer, a heart attack or
stroke at a late age)
Failing a class
Getting arrested
Getting pulled over by a police officer when driving
Getting in a physical altercation with somebody
Getting lost somewhere
Having no place to live
Getting into a minor traffic accident
Finding out that your romantic partner cheated on you
Being diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease (STD)
Being fired or laid off from a job
Entering a romantic relationship that is not approved by your parents
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No Yes 11. If you answered "Yes" to one or more of the questions above, which was the MOST traumatic thing
to have happened to you? Fill in the number of the question (e.g., #1 for accident,).
_________________________
Did you answer Yes to more than one question above while thinking about the same event?
Yes  No If yes, which items refer to the same event? ____________________________
12. To be sure that you indicated a most traumatic event, please write the event that was you most traumatic
here:

Now answer both #13 and #14 based on the most traumatic event that you
indicated in #12.
13. Thinking of the most traumatic event you indicated above, try to remember how you felt when it was
happening. If it happened more than once or over a long period, remember how you felt at the worst instance.
a. How afraid were you at the time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b. How helpless did you feel at the time?
Not at all
Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c. How much horror did you feel at the time?
None
Extreme
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. How much anger did you feel at the time?
None
Extreme
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. How much shock (or numbness) did you feel at the time?
None
Extreme
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. How much shame or guilt did you feel at the time?
None
Extreme
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. How well do you remember this event?
Not well at all
Very well
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Again thinking of the most traumatic experience you endorsed, please rate the level of support you felt at
the time and now. Support may include assistance in any of the following areas: physical, emotional, spiritual,
financial/material, transportation-related, and any other form of support you may have received. Support may have
been provided by family members and relatives, friends or acquaintances, neighbors, community members, medical
personnel, law enforcement officers, clergy, mental health professionals, or others.
a. How much support do you feel was available at the time of the event or shortly afterward?
None
A great deal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b. How much support do you feel that you received at the time of the event or shortly afterward?
None
A great deal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c. How helpful was the support your received at the time of the event or shortly afterward?
Not helpful
Very helpful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. How much support do you currently receive related to this event?
None
A great deal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Appendix C
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist – Civilian
INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDENT: Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have in
response to stressful experiences. Please read each one carefully, and blacken the circle to indicate how much you
have been bothered by that problem in the last month. Please answer these questions keeping in mind the
experience that you indicated on the previous questionnaire to be your most traumatic experience.
Not at all A little bit

Moderately Quite a bit Extremely















































































































Feeling as if your future will somehow be cut short?











13.

Trouble falling or staying asleep?











14.

Feeling irritable or having angry outbursts?











15.

Having difficulty concentrating?











16.

Being “super-alert” or watchful or on guard?











17.

Feeling jumpy or easily startled?











1.

Repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts, or images
of a stressful experience?

2.

Repeated, disturbing dreams of a stressful experience?

3.

Suddenly acting or feeling as if a stressful experience
were happening again (as if you were reliving it)?

4.

Feeling very upset when something reminded you of a
stressful experience?

5.

Having physical reactions (e.g., heart pounding, trouble
breathing, sweating) when something reminded you of a
stressful experience?

6.

Avoiding thinking about or talking about a stressful
experience or avoiding having feelings related to it?

7.

Avoiding activities or situations because they reminded
you of a stressful experience?

8.

Trouble remembering important parts of a stressful
experience?

9.

Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy?

10.

Feeling distant or cut off from other people?

11.

Feeling emotionally numb or being unable to have
loving feelings for those close to you?

12.
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Appendix D
Penn State Worry Questionnaire
Please rate the following statements according to how true they are for you. Use the following
scale:
1 – not at all typical of me
2 – a little bit typical of me
3 – moderately typical of me
4 – fairly typical of me
5 – very typical of me
1. If I do not have enough time to do everything,
I do not worry about it.*
2. My worries overwhelm me.
3. I do not tend to worry about things. *
4. Many situations make me worry.
5. I know I should not worry about things, but
I just cannot help it.
6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot.
7. I am always worrying about something.
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts.*
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry
about everything else I have to do.
10. I never worry about anything.*
11. When there is nothing more I can do about
a concern, I do not worry about it any more.*
12. I have been a worrier all my life.
13. I notice that I have been worrying about things.
14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop.
15. I worry all the time.
16. I worry about projects until they are all done.









1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
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Appendix E
White Bear Suppression Inventory
This survey is about thoughts. There are no right or wrong answers, so please respond
honestly to each of the items below. As you read through the following statements,
record whether you
A - Strongly Disagree
B - Disagree
C - Neutral or Don't Know
D - Agree
E - Strongly Agree
A B C D E

1. There are things I prefer not to think about.

A B C D E

2. Sometimes I wonder why I have the thoughts I do.

A B C D E

3. I have thoughts that I cannot stop.

A B C D E

4. There are images that come to mind that I cannot erase.

A B C D E

5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea.

A B C D E

6. I wish I could stop thinking of certain things.

A B C D E

7. Sometimes my mind races so fast I wish I could stop it.

A B C D E

8. I always try to put problems out of mind.

A B C D E

9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my head.

A B C D E

10. There are things that I try not to think about.

A B C D E

11. Sometimes I really wish I could stop thinking.

A B C D E

12. I often do things to distract myself from my thoughts.

A B C D E

13. I have thoughts that I try to avoid.

A B C D E

14. There are many thoughts that I have that I don't tell anyone.

A B C D E

15. Sometimes I stay busy just to keep thoughts from intruding on my
mind.
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Appendix F
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate the truth of each statement as it applies to
you. Use the following scale to make your choice.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7
Never
Very Rarely Seldom
Sometimes
Frequently
Almost Always Always
True
True
True
True
True
True
True
1. I am able to take action on a
problem even if I am uncertain
what is the right thing to do.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I often catch myself daydreaming
about things I’ve done and what
I would do differently next time.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. When I feel depressed or anxious,
I am unable to take care of my
responsibilities.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. I rarely worry about getting my
anxieties, worries, and feelings
under control.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. I’m not afraid of my feelings.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. When I evaluate something
negatively, I usually recognize
that this is just a reaction, not
an objective fact.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. When I compare myself to other
people, it seems that most of them
are handling their lives better than
I do.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. Anxiety is bad.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. If I could magically remove all the
painful experiences I’ve had in my
life, I would do so.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix G
Posttraumatic Growth Inventory
Indicate for each of the statements below the degree to which this change occurred in your life as
a result of the worst experience you indicated on the Traumatic Events Questionnaire, using
the following scale.
0 – I did not experience this change as a result of my crisis.
1 – I experienced this change to a very small degree as a result of my crisis.
2 – I experienced this change to a small degree as a result of my crisis.
3 – I experienced this change to a moderate degree as a result of my crisis.
4 – I experienced this change to a great degree as a result of my crisis.
5 – I experienced this change to a very great degree as a result of my crisis.
As a result of my crisis, I experienced a change in:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

My priorities about what is important in life.
An appreciation for the value of my own life.
I developed new interests.
A feeling of self-reliance.
A better understanding of spiritual matters.
Knowing that I can count on people in times
of trouble.
7. I established a new path for my life.
8. A sense of closeness with others.
9. A willingness to express my emotions.
10. Knowing I can handle difficulties.
11. I’m able to do better things with my life.
12. Being able to accept the way things work out.
13. Appreciating each day.
14. New opportunities are available which
wouldn’t have been otherwise.
15. Having compassion for others.
16. Putting effort into my relationships.
17. I’m more likely to try to change things
which need changing.
18. I have a stronger religious faith.
19. I discovered that I’m stronger than I thought
I was.
20. I learned a great deal about how wonderful
people are.
21. I accept needing others.

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

0
0
0

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

0

1

2

3

4

5

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5
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Appendix H
Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory
We are interested in the kind of thoughts which you may have had after a traumatic experience. Answer these items
based on your thoughts about the worst experience you indicated on the Traumatic Events Questionnaire.
Below are a number of statements that may or may not be representative of your thinking. Please read each
statement carefully and tell us how much you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement. People react to traumatic
events in many different ways. There are no right or wrong answers to these statements.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Totally disagree
Disagree very much
Disagree slightly
Neutral
Agree slightly
Agree very much
Totally agree

The event happened because of the way I acted.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I can’t trust that I will do the right thing.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I am a weak person.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I will not be able to control my anger and will do something terrible.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I can’t deal with even the slightest upset.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I used to be a happy person but now I am always miserable.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
People can’t be trusted.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I have to be on guard all the time.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I feel dead inside.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
You can never know who will harm you.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I have to be especially careful because you never know what will happen next.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I am inadequate.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I will not be able to control my emotions, and something terrible will happen. *
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
If I think about the event, I will not be able to handle it.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
The event happened to me because of the sort of person I am.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
My reactions since the event mean that I am going crazy.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I will never be able to feel normal emotions again.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
The world is a dangerous place.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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19. Somebody else would have stopped the event from happening.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
20. I have permanently changed for the worse.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
21. I feel like an object, not like a person.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
22. Somebody else would not have gotten into this situation.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
23. I can’t rely on other people.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
24. I feel isolated and set apart from others.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
25. I have no future.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
26. I can’t stop bad things from happening to me.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
27. People are not what they seem.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
28. My life has been destroyed by the trauma.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
29. There is something wrong with me as a person.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
30. My reactions since the event show that I am a lousy coper.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
31. There is something about me that made the event happen.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
32. I will not be able to tolerate my thoughts about the event, and I will fall apart.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
33. I feel like I don’t know myself anymore.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
34. You never know when something terrible will happen.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
35. I can’t rely on myself.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
36. Nothing good can happen to me anymore.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Appendix I
Dispositional Resilience Index
Below are statements about life that people often feel differently about. Circle a number
to show how you feel about each one. Read the items carefully and indicate how much
you think each one is true in general. There are no right or wrong answers; just give
your own honest opinions.
Not at all true = 0
A little true = 1
Quite true = 2
Completely true = 3
1. Most of my life gets spent doing things that are worthwhile.

0

1

2

3

2. Planning ahead can help avoid most future problems.

0

1

2

3

3. No matter how hard I try, my efforts usually accomplish nothing.* 0

1

2

3

4. I don’t like to make changes in my everyday schedule.*

0

1

2

3

5. The “tried and true” ways are always best.*

0

1

2

3

6. Working hard doesn’t matter, since only the bosses profit by it.* 0

1

2

3

7. By working hard you can always achieve your goals.

0

1

2

3

8. Most of what happens in life is just meant to be.*

0

1

2

3

9. When I make plans, I’m certain I can make them work.

0

1

2

3

10. It’s exciting to learn something about myself.

0

1

2

3

11. I really look forward to my work.

0

1

2

3

12. If I’m working on a difficult task, I know when to seek help.

0

1

2

3

13. I won’t answer a question until I’m really sure I understand it.*

0

1

2

3

14. I like a lot of variety in my work.

0

1

2

3

15. Most of the time, people listen carefully to what I say.

0

1

2

3

16. Thinking of yourself as a free person just leads to frustration.*

0

1

2

3

17. Trying your best at work really pays off in the end.

0

1

2

3

18. My mistakes are usually very difficult to correct.*

0

1

2

3

19. It bothers me when my daily routine gets interrupted.*

0

1

2

3

20. Most good athletes and leaders are born, not made.*

0

1

2

3

21. I often wake up eager to take up my life wherever it left off.

0

1

2

3

22. Lots of times, I don’t really know my own mind.*

0

1

2

3
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23. I respect rules because they guide me.*

0

1

2

3

24. I like it when things are uncertain or unpredictable.

0

1

2

3

25. I can’t do much to prevent it if someone wants to harm me.*

0

1

2

3

26. Changes in routine are interesting to me.

0

1

2

3

27. Most days, life is really interesting and exciting for me.

0

1

2

3

28. It’s hard to imagine anyone getting excited about working.*

0

1

2

3

29. What happens to me tomorrow depends on what I do today.

0

1

2

3

30. Ordinary work is just too boring to be worth doing.*

0

1

2

3
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Appendix J
Self-efficacy Scale
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements by marking the scale below
each item.
1.

When I make plans, I am certain I can make them work.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
strongly
disagree

12

13

14
strongly
agree

2.

One of my problems is that I cannot get down to work when I should.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
strongly
strongly
disagree
agree

3.

If I can’t do a job the first time, I keep trying until I can.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
strongly
disagree

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

12

When I set important goals for myself, I rarely achieve them.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
strongly
disagree
I give up on things before completing them.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
strongly
disagree
I avoid facing difficulties.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
strongly
disagree

7

8

9

13

14
strongly
agree

13

14
strongly
agree

10

11

12

13

14
strongly
agree

10

11

12

13

14
strongly
agree

13

14
strongly
agree

13

14
strongly
agree

13

14
strongly
agree

If something looks too complicated, I will not even bother to try it.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
strongly
disagree
When I have something unpleasant to do, I stick to it until I finish it.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
strongly
disagree
When I decide to do something, I go right to work on it.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
strongly
disagree

12

10. When trying to learn something new, I soon give up if I am not initially successful.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
strongly
strongly
disagree
agree
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11. When unexpected problems occur, I don’t handle them well.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
strongly
disagree

12

13

14
strongly
agree

12. I avoid trying to learn new things when they look too difficult for me.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
strongly
strongly
disagree
agree
13. Failure just makes me try harder.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
strongly
disagree

8

9

14. I feel insecure about my ability to do things.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
strongly
disagree
15. I am a self-reliant person.
1
2
3
4
5
strongly
disagree
16. I give up easily.*
1
2
3
4
strongly
disagree

5

10

11

12

13

14
strongly
agree

10

11

12

13

14
strongly
agree

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14
strongly
agree

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14
strongly
agree

17. I do not seem capable of dealing with most problems that come up in life.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
strongly
strongly
disagree
agree
18. It is difficult for me to make new friends.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
strongly
disagree

10

11

12

13

14
strongly
agree

19. If I see someone I would like to meet, I go to that person instead of waiting for him or her to come to me.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
strongly
strongly
disagree
agree
20. If I meet someone interesting who is hard to make friends with, I’ll soon stop trying to make friends with
that person.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
strongly
strongly
disagree
agree
21. When I’m trying to become friends with someone who seems uninterested at first, I don’t give up easily.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
strongly
strongly
disagree
agree
22. I do not handle myself well in social gatherings.*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
strongly
disagree

11

12

13

14
strongly
agree
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23. I have acquired my friends through my personal abilities at making friends.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
strongly
strongly
disagree
agree
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Appendix K
Coping Self-Efficacy Scale
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Appendix L
Anxiety Control Questionnaire
Listed below are a number of statements describing a set of beliefs. Please read each
statement carefully, and, on the 0-5 scale given, indicate how much you think each
statement is typical of you.
0--------------------1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5
Strongly
Disagree

Moderately
Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Moderately
Agree

Strongly
Agree

_____ 1. I am usually able to avoid threat quite easily.
_____ 2. How well I cope with difficult situations depends on whether I have outside
help.*
_____ 3. When I am put under stress, I am likely to lose control.*
_____ 4. I can usually stop my anxiety from showing.
_____ 5. When I am frightened by something, there is generally nothing I can do.*
_____ 6. My emotions seem to have a life of their own.*
_____ 7. There is little I can do to influence people’s judgments of me.*
_____ 8. Whether I can successfully escape a frightening situation is always a matter of
chance with me. *
_____ 9. I often shake uncontrollably.*
_____ 10. I can usually put worrisome thoughts out of my mind easily.
_____ 11. When I am in a stressful situation, I am able to stop myself from breathing too
hard.
_____ 12. I can usually influence the degree to which a situation is potentially
threatening to me.
_____ 13. I am able to control my level of anxiety.
_____ 14. There is little I can do to change frightening events.*
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_____ 15. The extent to which a difficult situation resolves itself has nothing to do with
my actions. *
_____ 16. If something is going to hurt me, it will happen no matter what I do.*
_____ 17. I can usually relax when I want.
_____ 18. When I am under stress, I am not always sure how I will react.*
_____ 19. I can usually make sure people like me if I work at it.
_____ 20. Most events that make me anxious are outside my control.*
_____ 21. I always know exactly how I will react to difficult situations.
_____ 22. I am unconcerned if I become anxious in a difficult situation, because I am
confident in my ability to cope with my symptoms.
_____ 23. What people think of me is largely outside my control.*
_____ 24. I usually find it hard to deal with difficult problems.*
_____ 25. When I hear that someone has a serious illness, I worry that I am next.*
_____ 26. When I am anxious, I find it difficult to focus on anything other than my
anxiety.*
_____ 27. I am able to cope as effectively with unexpected anxiety as I am with anxiety
that I expect to occur.
_____ 28. I sometimes think, “Why even bother to try to cope with my anxiety when
nothing I do seems to affect how frequently or intensely I experience it?”*
_____ 29. I often have the ability to get along with “difficult” people.
_____ 30. I will avoid conflict due to my inability to successfully resolve it.*
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Appendix M
Informed Consent Form
Project Title: Predictors of PTSD Symptoms for Criterion A Events and Nonqualifying Events
Investigator: Sarah Reiland, M.S., Eastern Michigan University
Co-Investigator: Dean Lauterbach, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology at Eastern Michigan
University
1.

Purpose Of The Study: The purpose of the study is to investigate factors that
contribute to the perception of an event as stressful.

2.

Procedure: A research assistant will explain the study to you, answer any questions
you may have, and witness your signature to this consent form. You must be at least
18-years-old to take part in this study.
You will be asked to complete twelve brief questionnaires: a demographic
questionnaire, a life events questionnaire, several measures of your responses to
stressful life events, and several questionnaires about your beliefs about yourself and
others.
Upon completing the questionnaires, you will be given a duplicate copy of the
informed consent, which includes follow-up contact information, if needed. The
approximate total time to complete the questionnaires should be about 60 minutes.

3.

Confidentiality: Only a code number will identify your questionnaire responses. The
results will be stored separately from the consent form, which includes your name and
any other identifying information. At no time will your name be associated with your
responses to the questionnaires.
All information will be kept in locked file cabinets of the study investigator.

4.

Expected Risks: There are no forseeable risks to you by completing the
questionnaires. Some questions ask about traumatic events you have experienced, and
it is possible that these questions may elicit an emotional reaction from you.

5.

Expected Benefits Of The Study: Your participation will help our understanding of
trauma and other forms of stress and their effects. This information will help the
future treatment of trauma-exposed individuals. If your instructor gives extra credit
for research participation, you may receive extra credit in one of your psychology
classes for your participation. The amount of extra credit to be earned, if any, will be
decided by your instructor.
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6.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose
not to participate. If you do decide to participate, you can change your mind at any
time and withdraw from the study without negative consequences.

7.

Use of Research Results: Results will be presented in aggregate form only. No
names or individually identifying information will be revealed. Results may be
presented at research meetings and conferences, in scientific publications, and as part
of a doctoral dissertation being conducted by the principal investigator.

8.

Future Questions: If you have any questions concerning your participation in this
study now or in the future, you can contact the principal investigator, Sarah Reiland,
at 734-487-1155 (main psychology department office) or via e-mail at
sreiland@emich.edu.
This research protocol and informed consent document have been reviewed and
approved by the Eastern Michigan University Human Subjects Review Committee for
use from _______ to ________. If you have questions about the approval process,
please contact Dr. Deb de Laski-Smith, Interim Dean of the Graduate School and
Administrative Co-Chair of UHSCR (734-487-0042, human.subjects@emich.edu)

Consent to Participate: I have read or have read to me all of the above information about
this research study, including the research procedures, possible risks, side effects, and the
likelihood of any benefit to me. The content and meaning of this information has been
explained, and I understand. All my questions, at this time, have been answered. I hereby
consent and do voluntarily offer to follow the study requirements and take part in the study.
In the event that I experience emotional reactions that are difficult for me to manage, I
understand that the investigator or her assistants may contact a clinical supervisor for
consultation and that a referral to a mental health agency, or notification of my condition to
the staff at Snow Counseling Center, may be made. I also understand that I should notify the
investigator or her assistants if I am having significant emotional distress in response to
participation in the study. I understand that I can also receive free psychological counseling
at Snow Health Center (734-487-1118) if I am a student or low-cost therapy at the EMU
Psychology Clinic (734-487-4987).

PRINT NAME: __________________________________
Signatures
___________________________
Participant (your signature)

______________
Date

_____________________________
Investigator or Specified Designee

______________
Date
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Appendix N
Informed Consent Script
My name is Sarah Reiland, and I am the principal investigator for a study looking at
exposure to traumatic events and your thoughts about these events. There are twelve
questionnaires that you will complete as part of the study. Eleven are very short, and one is
of moderate length. It will probably take 45 to 60 minutes to complete all questionnaires.
Before you complete the questionnaires, there is an informed consent form for you to read
and sign. I am passing out two copies: one is for you to sign and turn in to me, and the other
is for you to keep for your records. As you are reading this form, I will explain its contents.
Some questions inquire about traumatic events you may have experienced, which may
cause you discomfort. You have the right to discontinue the study anytime without penalty.
All your responses are confidential. Your identifying information will be destroyed after we
collect the questionnaires. Your participation in the study will contribute to our
understanding of the effects of traumatic experiences and other stressful experiences. If you
are interested in a copy of the results, write your contact information on the informed consent
form, and it will be provided to you after the study has been completed.
Thank you.
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Appendix O
Breslau & Kessler’s (2001) list of 19 events that meet criterion A1
Military combat
Rape
Held captive/tortured/kidnapped
Shot/stabbed
Sexual assault other than rape
Mugged/threatened with weapon
Badly beaten
Serious car accident
Other serious accident
Natural disaster
Life-threatening illness
Child’s life-threatening illness
Witness killing/serious injuries
Discovered dead body
Learning of the rape or sexual assault of someone close
Learning that someone close was seriously attacked
Learning that someone close experienced a serious car accident
Learning that someone close experienced another kind of serious accident
Learning of the sudden unexpected death of someone close

